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Alternative Career Resolution: An
Essay on the Removal of Federal
Judges*
By STEPHEN B. BURBANK**
INTRODUCTION
This is a critical time for the federal judiciary and hence for
all of us. For the first time in fifty years, the House has im-
peached, and the Senate has removed a federal judge, Harry
Claiborne.' A subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee
* Copyright 1988 by Stephen B. Burbank.
** Professor of Law, Umversity of Pennsylvama. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973, Harvard
Umversity. A shorter version of this Essay was presented at the Kentucky Law Journal's
Symposium on Judicial Discipline and Impeachment on October 12, 1987, at the Univer-
sity of Kentucky College of Law. Edward Grosz and Robert Hoyt, class of 1989, provided
excellent research assistance.
United States District Judge Harry Claiborne was impeached by the House of
Representatives on July 22, 1986, 132 CONG. REc. H4710-21 (daily ed. July 22, 1986),
and removed from office by the Senate on October 9, 1986. 132 CONG. REc. S15,759-62
(daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986). The last previous impeachment of a federal judge, or any other
person holding federal office, was that of United States District Judge Halsted Ritter in
1936. 80 CONG. REc. 3066-92 (1936). Ritter was removed from office in the same year.
80 CONG. Rc. 5602-08 (1936).
According to the Constitution:
The House of Representatives shall have the sole Power of Im-
peachment.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cI. 5.
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try a Impeachments. When
sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And
no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the
Members present.
Judgment m Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
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is presently investigating a second federal judge, Alcee Hastings,
whose impeachment is called for by a resolution introduced last
year.2 A third federal judge, Walter Nixon, whose criminal con-
viction was affirmed on appeal, 3 has followed Claiborne's ex-
ample by refusing to resign, and a resolution calling for his
impeachment was recently referred to another subcommittee. 4
There has been a flurry of legislative activity in response to
these developments. Startled by the need to use the impeachment
process against Judge Claiborne, a convicted felon who had
exhausted appeals, and before that process had been completed,
legislators in the House and Senate introduced resolutions pro-
posing constitutional amendments that would make removal au-
tomatic in such cases.5 When the process had run its course and
in contemplation of a more difficult case, another senator pro-
posed a broader constitutional amendment. 6
Pumshment, according to Law.
Id. at § 3, cl. 6-7.
The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other lugh Crimes and Misdemeanors.
Id. at art. II, § 4.
2 See H.R. Res. 128, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) (resolution impeaching United
States District Judge Alcee Hastings); 133 CONG. REc. H1506, 1514 (daily ed. Mar. 23,
1987).
, See United States v. Nixon, 827 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 749 (1988).
4 The day after the Supreme Court demed review of his conviction for perjury,
see supra note 3, Judge Walter Nixon announced that he would not resign. See Rodino
Announces Impeachment Inquiry (March 17, 1988) (news release) (copy available from
author). A resolution impeaching lum was introduced on March 17, 1988, H.R. Res. 407,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), and it was referred to the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights. See Rodino Announces Impeachment Inquiry, supra.
See H.R.J. Res. 658, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R.J. Res. 665, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986); S.J. Res. 364, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S.J. Res. 370, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986). For an analysis of the Senate resolutions, see Hearing on S.J. Res. 364
& S.J. Res. 370 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-39 (1986) [hereinafter Hearing on S.J. Res. 364 & S.J.
Res. 370] (statement of Stephen B. Burbank). Cf. H.R.J. Res. 680, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986) (proposing constitutional amendment empowering Congress to provide by law for
diminution of salary of federal judge convicted of felony).
6 See S.J. Res. 113, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987). S.J. Res. 370, supra note 5,
introduced by Senator DeConcim in 1986, included a broader proposal as well as a
proposal for automatic forfeiture of office upon conviction of a felony and exhaustion
of direct appeals. See infra note 9; see also H.R.J. Res. 364, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988).
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At the same time that federal judges were involved in crim-
inal proceedings, and when impeachment proceedings were in
prospect, legislators were considering experience under 1980 leg-
islation that, for the first time, provided a statutory supplement
to the arrangements prescribed by the Constitution. 7 Although
that consideration included oversight hearings intended to be
helpful to the judges in meeting their responsibilities under this
legislation,8 it also included a proposal to scrap the 1980 scheme
in favor of a constitutional blank check to Congress because of
the alleged "inactivity" of the judges. 9
This is hardly the first time that the means devised by the
framers to preserve the independence of federal judges have
been at risk. Thomas Jefferson, at one time an advocate of
judicial independence, 10 came to view the question differently
and apparently hoped to use the impeachment process to remove
federalist justices from the Supreme Court. His plan came a
cropper with the Senate's failure to convict Justice Samuel
Chase." The independence of federal judges was again under
attack early in this century The recall of judges was as dear to
7 Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (effective Oct. 1, 1981). The Act's
disciplinary procedures are contained id. at § 3, 94 Stat. 2035, 2036-40 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 372(c) (1982)). See generally Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. Ray.
283 (1982-83).
1 See Oversight Hearing on Federal Judicial Branch Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing].
9 132 CONo. Rc. S8746 (daily ed. June 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
Senator DeConcini's remarks were made in connection with S.J. Res. 370, supra note 5,
which included the following proposed constitutional amendment:
The Congress shall have the power by appropriate legislation to set standards
and guidelines by which the Supreme Court may discipline judges appointed
pursuant to Article III who bring disrepute on the Federal Courts or the
admimstration of justice by the courts. Such discipline may include removal
from office and diminution of compensation.
"1 See, e.g., G. HAsKiNs & H. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SuPREME COURT OF THE
UNrrmD STATEs: FoUNnATIONS OF POWER: JoHN MARSHALL, 1801-15, at 205-45 (1981);
Stevens, Reflections on the Removal of Sitting Judges, 13 STETSON L. REV. 215, 218-19
(1983-84).
" See, e.g., P HoFFER & N. HuLL, Im'FEAcHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 181-
90, 228-55 (1984); Blackmar, On the Removal of Judges: The Impeachment Trial of
Samuel Chase, 48 J. Am. JUDicATURE Soc'Y 183 (1964-65); Stevens, supra note 10, at
218-20; Swindler, High Court of Congress: Impeachment Trials, 1797-1936, 60 A.B.A.
J. 420, 421-24 (1974).
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Theodore Roosevelt as it was repellent to William Howard Taft.1 2
At least one scholar has viewed the removal of Judge Archbald
in 1913 as in part a response to the recall movement.' 3 Finally,
although this is hardly an exhaustive account, we may remember
"Impeach Earl Warren" billboards. 14 We may not remember,
however, that Justice Douglas was put to considerable trouble
in averting impeachment in 1970.11
Nor is this the first time that unhappiness with the consti-
tutional arrangements for removal of federal judges has led to
congressional advocacy of alternatives. On the contrary, consti-
tutional amendments have been proposed in Congress since early
in our history 16 In the aftermath of the removal of Judge
Halsted Ritter in 1936,17 serious attention was given to statutory
proposals that included and foundered on provisions authorizing
removal by alternative means. 8 Similar proposals were revived
in response to publicity surrounding a few federal judges in the
1960s, and, in a public well poisoned by Watergate, such pro-
posals became a major item on the congressional agenda in the
nd-1970s. 9 For present purposes, the remarkable fact is not
that Congress managed to enact compromise legislation in 1980
but that, before the legislation became effective and ever since
that time, legislators have introduced bills and resolutions the
12 See, e.g., Subnn, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 955 (1986-87).
" See Ten Broek, Partisan Politics and Federal Judgeship Impeachment Since 1903,
23 MINN. L. REv 185, 192-93 (1938-39); cf. Peterson, Recall of Judges and Impeachment,
86 CENT. L.J. 242, 245 (1918) ("The movement for the recall of judges is largely based
on dissatisfaction with the present system of impeachment.").
'4 See Blackmar, supra note 11, at 183.
"1 See SpEcIAL SuBcomm. ON H.R. Ras. 920 OF TBE HOUSE Comm. ON THE JUDICIARY,
FINAL REPORT ON ASSOCIATE JusnCE WmUAm 0. DourLrAs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
Appendix D to this report, occupying one hundred pages, contains the fact brief and a
reply memorandum filed by Simon Rifkind, Justice Douglas' attorney.
16 For example, on February 7, 1806, Representative Randolph introduced a reso-
lution calling for a constitutional amendment to provide for removal by address. See 9
ANNALS OF CONG. 446 (1806); see also J. Boiucni, Tim CopRuPT JUDGE 195-96 (1962)
(the date given by Borkin for the Eighth Congress is incorrect); Bingham, A Proposed
Constitutional Amendment Regarding Impeachment Proceedings, 65 U.S.L. REV 323
(1931) (the author was a senator).
7 See supra note 1.
" See Burbank, supra note 7, at 291-92 n.24; Otis, A Proposed Tribunal: Is It
Constitutional?, 7 U. KAN. CrTY L. REv 1 (1938).
'9 See Burbank, supra note 7, at 291-94.
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effect if not the purpose of which would have been to undo
those hard-won compromises."
Nor is this the first time that proposals for wholesale change
have been introduced without serious attention to adjustments
in current arrangements. That too has been the norm. The
Senate's rules governing removal trials have changed very little
since the trial of President Andrew Johnson in 1868.21 A 1935
For proposed legislation, see H.R. 994, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 3018,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 202 (1982); Burbank, supra note 7, at 347 n.276.
The number and character of proposed constitutional amendments affecting judicial
tenure that have been introduced since 1980 are stunning. They may be grouped roughly
as follows: (1) retention election: H.R.J. Res. 451, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (every 6
years); (2) limited term and/or limited tenure: H.R.J. Res. 325, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) (6 year terms; 12 year limit); H.R.J. Res. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (10
years dunng any 12 year period); H.R.J. Res. 30, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (10 years
during any 12 year penod); H.R.J. Res. 144, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (10 years dunng
any 12 year penod); H.R.J. Res. 90, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (8 years); H.R.J. Res.
51, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (10 years during any 12 year period); H.R.J. Res. 8,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (6 year terms; 12 year limit); S.J. Res. 24, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981) (10 years but reappointment permitted to another court); (3) limited term
unless Senate consents to continuance in office: H.R.J. Res. 168, 100th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1087) (10 years); H.R.J. Res. 184, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (10 years); H.R.J. Res.
628, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (6 years); H.R.J. Res. 264, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)
(10 years); H.R.J. Res. 490, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (10 years); H.R.J. Res. 427,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (6 years); (4) limited term unless President nominates and
Senate consents to continuance in office: H.R.J. Res. 177, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
(Supreme Court Justices to serve 15 year terms but eligible for reappointment); H.R.J.
Res. 557, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (Supreme Court Justices to serve 15 year terms but
eligible for reappointment); H.R.J. Res. 103, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (10 years); S.J.
Res. 30, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (10 years); H.R.J. Res. 374, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983) (10 years); H.R.J. Res. 252, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (10 years); S.J. Res. 39,
98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (10 years); H.R.J. Res. 60, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (10
years); S.J. Res. 21, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (10 years); (5) limited term and/or age
restrictions: H.R.J. Res. 419, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (10 year term and age limit of
70 for judges of inferior courts; no appointment to any federal court after attaining 60);
(6) good behavior but removal by Senate resolution: H.R.J. Res. 56, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985) (during 10th year of any 10 year period); H.R.J. Res. 17, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983) (dunng 10th year of any 10 year period); H.R.J. Res. 570, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982) (during 10th year of any 10 year period).
For other proposed constitutional amendments regarding tenure, see supra notes 5-
6 and accompanying text. For another method of attack on the federal judiciary, see
Feinberg, Constraining "The Least Dangerous Branch" The Tradition of Attack on
Judicial Power, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 252 (1984) (attempts to limit the jurisdiction of federal
courts).
21 See Senate Rules and Precedents Applicable to Impeachment Trials: Hearings
Before the Comm. on Rules and Administration, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 171 (1974) [here-
inafter Senate Rules] (letter from Hon. Mike Mansfield); Futterman, The Rules of
Impeachment, 24 KAN. L. REv. 105, 105 (1975-76).
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amendment authorizing evidence-taking by a committee,2 which
had been advocated as early as 1904,2 was not availed of in the
trial of Judge Ritter in 1936,24 and the latter trial prompted not
additional attention to Senate rules but attempts to avoid similar
trials in the future. 25 Almost forty years later, when the Senate
was next confronted with the serious prospect of a trial on
articles of impeachment, its Rules Committee-understandably
concerned about appearing to change the rules after the game
had started-eschewed comprehensive overhaul in favor of mi-
nor adjustments. 26 After President Nixon defaulted, the Senate
too left the court, its rules unchanged. 27 When a crisis loomed
again in 1986, the Senate dusted off the 1974 proposed amend-
ments and implemented them without change.2
This may, however, be the first time that Congress seriously
considers constitutional amendments relating to the removal of
federal judges. The vehicle of change-or should I say the change
of vehicle-is not surprising in light of the animated constitu-
tional debate that has attended statutory proposals over the last
fifty years. 29 Moreover, recent attacks on Congress' 1980 com-
promise in the courts and in the literature0 demonstrate the
fragility of legislation in this area, even that which carefully
22 S. Res. 18, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); see 79 CONG. R]Ec. 8309-10 (1935). For
the history of use of committees by the Senate in impeachment trials, see Procedure and
Guidelines for Impeachment Trials in the United States Senate, S. Doc. No. 102, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (1974). See also infra text accompanying notes 202-22.
23 See 38 CoNG. REc. 3360, 3992 (1904); J. BoRmiN, supra note 16, at 197. Borkin
was unaware of the 1935 change in the Senate rules. See id. Senator Hoar apparently
made is proposal in anticipation of the impeachment and trial of Judge Swayne. See 38
CONG. REc. 3732 (1904).
24 See, e.g., 80 CoNG. RiEc. 4982 (1936).
2 See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
See S. Res. 390, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); 120 CONG. RFc. 29,811-13 (1974);
see also, e.g., Senate Rules, supra note 21, at 8, 88, 95, 97.
" S. Res. 390, supra note 26, was laid on the table by motion of Senator Byrd on
December I1, 1974. 120 CoNG. REc. 39,054 (1974).
1, See S. Res. 479, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); 132 CONG. REc. S11,902-03 (daily
ed. Aug. 15, 1986).
2 See Burbank, supra note 7, at 291-308. In fact, this represents a return to the
vehicle originally proposed. See supra text accompanying note 16.
10 See, e.g., Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 593 F Supp.
1371 (1984), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986); Note, Unnecessary and Improper: The Judicial Councils
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94 YALE L.J. 1117 (1984-85).
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excepts removal. The record of the debate and awareness of
current attacks should suffice to persuade today's legislators that
removal pursuant to statute is unlikely to survive constitutional
challenge.
Proceeding by way of constitutional amendment has the
distinct advantage of mooting arguments rooted in the decent
obscurity of arrangements framed two hundred years ago. Con-
gress is spared the difficult and hazardous task of restoration.
A new canvas is available for the work of contemporary artists
and the judgment of contemporary critics, both of them at least
formally unencumbered by traditions if not by conventions.
Conventions are, of course, a distinct disadvantage in the
art of constitutional amendment. 31 The work of the artists, ex-
pensive enough to create, has no market until it has been ap-
proved by a process of cntical judgment that is vastly more
expensive. No matter what the subject, the transaction costs of
a constitutional amendment are enormous, and they increase as
the-subject becomes more controversial.
Moreover, even contemporary artists should hesitate to urge
that their work, however distinguished, replace one panel of a
triptych by old masters that has been displayed for two hundred
years. When the subject of a proposed constitutional amendment
involves matters that are basic to the operations of one branch
of the federal government, transaction costs are as nothing com-
pared to the costs of potential error in treating a polycentric
problem 32 as if it had only one dimension.
11 The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention
for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all
Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in
three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress
U.S. Cor T. art. V See generally M.F BERRY, WHY ERA FAmRE (1986).
12 One useful approach, developed by Lon Fuller, is the concept of the
"polycentnc" ("many-centered") problem. As described by Fuller, the po-
lycentric issue is characterized by a large number of possible results and by
the fact that many interests or groups will be affected by any solution
adopted; thus, each potential solution will have complex and umque rami-
fications. In graphic terms, the polycentnc controversy can be visualized as
1987-88]
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This Essay is intended as a cautionary note to those who,
quite correctly, have concluded that constitutional amendment
is the only way to replace current arrangements for the removal
of federal judges. It proceeds from the premise that an inde-
pendent federal judiciary is essential to the maintenance of the
delicate balance of federal powers3 3 and that, therefore, propos-
als that might dimimsh the judiciary's independence should
emerge from a process of wide-ranging and careful study I take
the position that, because the stakes are so high, the process
should include comparative assessment not just of current ar-
rangements and proposed alternatives under a new constitutional
grant but also of adjustments that might be made with fidelity
to the provisions of the Constitution and thus without change
to those provisions.
The problem of removal of federal judges must be set in
context. The relevant contexts include both the place of judicial
independence in our scheme of government and the place of
removal in the arsenal of weapons available to deal with mis-
behaving or disabled federal judges. Assuming general agreement
as to the first, I will operate largely within the second. Change
by constitutional amendment should be deferred until it is clear
that adjustments faithful to the Constitution would be either an
inadequate response to perceived problems or a demonstrably
less satisfactory response than the alternatives.
I. A SURVEY OF CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS
It may be hard for us to imagine a federal judiciary that is
not independent, because we have never known it any other way
The framers were, however, acutely conscious of the dangers of
a spider web, since "[a] pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a
complicated pattern throughout the web as a whole [E]ach crossing
of strands is a distinct center for distributing tension."
Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Complex Scien-
tific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 111, 116-17 (1972-73) (footnotes
omitted).
13 See, e.g., Greenhouse, House Unit Concludes Federal Judges Cannot Be Im-
peached for Their Rulings, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1986, at 3, col. 1. But see supra note
20 (listing numerous proposals for constitutional amendmentt within the last seven years
that would dimmsh if not destroy the independence of federal judges).
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domination of the judiciary, and they sought to prevent such
domination by provisions guaranteeing tenure during good be-
havior and undimimshed compensation. 34 Moreover, although
arguments have emerged during the last fifty years or so asserting
that a federal judge can be removed by means other than that
specifically provided in the Constitution,35 both the text3 6 and
the views of its earliest expositors37 affirm the verdict of history
in favor of the exclusivity of the impeachment process.3 8
The framers recogmzed that the impeachment process would
be arduous; indeed, by rejecting a substantive norm of great
elasticity, they signaled an intent to ensure that it not be lightly
commenced. 39 Their deliberations, however, revolved chiefly
around the President, who would be subject to periodic elec-
tions.40 Federal judges are not so subject, and for that reason
alone, it is important to consider the entire array of checks
against their misconduct or disability
A. The Appointments Process
The appointments process for federal judges constitutes a
first line of defense.41 There is no excuse for the. President to
34 "The Judges, both of the supreme and mfenor Courts, shall hold their Offices
dunng good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compen-
sation, which shall not be dimimshed dunng their Continuance in Office." U.S. CoNST.
art. III, § 1; see 2 THE REcoRDs OF TE FEDEmAL CoNvENTIoN Or 1787 428-30 (M.
Farrand rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter Farrand]; THE FEDERAIST Nos. 78 & 79 (A. Hamilton);
I Tm WoRKs OF JAmEs WILSON 323-31 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
11 See, e.g., R. BERGER, ImrAcmHmTrr: THE CoNsTrrTIoNAL PROBLEMS 122-80
(1973); Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possi-
bilities Under the Constitution, 28 MIcH. L. Rav 870 (1929-30).
36 See supra note 1.
31 See Tm FanDE.A=S Nos. 78 & 79 (A. Hamilton); 1 Tm WoRKs OF JAmrs
WiLsoN, supra note 34, at 326; W RAwILE, A Vinw oF TE CONsTrrUTION OF THE UNTED
SrATas OF AMERiCA 208 (1825); 3 J. STORY, CommENTA1iEs ON Tm CONsTrrIUoN OF TER
UNIrrED STATEs § 1629 (1833); see also id. §§ 1625-26.
31' See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1980); Otis, supra
note 18, at 3-10.
39 See 2 Farrand, supra note 34, at 550.
0 See id. at 64-69.
4' "[The President] shall nomnate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law. " U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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nominate to the federal bench a person whose life to that point
contains substantial evidence, accessible to skilled investigators,
of, or of vulnerability to, misconduct or disability that would
be unacceptable in a judge. There is similarly no excuse for the
Senate to confirm a nominee in the absence of proof of skilled
investigation and of the informed judgment of the nominee's
peers concerning his or her character and fitness for judicial
office. 42
B. Retirement and Disability Statutes
Physical or mental disability may not be detectible through
skilled investigation; they may not exist or may not be foresee-
able at the time of appointment. It is hard to view insanity as
a species of "[t]reason, [b]ribery, or other high [c]rime[] and
[m]isdemeanor[] ' ' 43 and equally hard to believe that the framers
consigned us to the ravings of a lunatic judge until death.
Hamilton dealt with the subject in a passage of exquisite ambi-
guity " The removal of Judg4 Pickering can be laid to other
42 The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the President singly and
absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would He entirely at the
door of the Senate; aggravated by the consideration of their having coun-
teracted the good intentions of the Executive. If an ill appointment should
be made, the Executive for nominating, and the Senate for approving,
would participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and
disgrace.
Tan EDmERALisT No. 77, at 94 (A. Hamilton) (E. Bourne ed. 1901).
U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 4.
, The want of a provision for removing the judges on account of inability
has been a subject of complaint. But all considerate men will be sensible
that such a provision would either not be practiced upon or would be more
liable to abuse than calculated to answer any good purpose. The mensuration
of the faculties of the mind has, I believe, no place in the catalogue of
known arts. An attempt to fix the boundary between the regions of ability
and inability, would much oftener give scope to personal and party attach-
ments and enmities than advance the interests of justice or the public good.
The result, except in the case of insanity, must for the most part be arbitrary;
and insanity, without any formal or express provision, may be safely pro-
nounced to be a virtual disqualification.
TaE FEDERALST No. 79, supra note 42, at 109 (A. Hamilton).
After repeating much of this passage, Justice Story concluded: "And instances of
absolute imbecility would be too rare to justify the introduction of so dangerous a
provision." 3 J. STORY, supra note 37, at § 1619.
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grounds, although he apparently was insane.45 The disabled fed-
eral judge has been a problem throughout our history, both in
his own right and as a tool of the corrupt,4 but the problem
was one that Congress always had the power to correct and that
it has now gone far to correct. Sensible and humane statutes
governing retirement, 47 disability,41 senior status, 49 and annuities s°
should spare us another Pickering. The 1980 Act completed the
remedial scheme with provisions that, albeit more controversial,
address the situation of a disabled judge who cannot or will not
accept what is apparent to everybody else.5 '
C. The Shadow of the Impeachment Process
Misconduct may not be the habit of a lifetime; indeed, life
tenure may bring it forth. In addition, not every species of
misconduct by a federal judge warrants impeachment and re-
moval. The costs of the process ensure that the presumption
runs the other way How then can it be true, as one student of
judicial corruption has concluded, that those few federal judges
who have been the subject of a solemn judgment of removal by
the Senate are, in a hierarchy of judicial infamy, the misde-
meanants rather than the felons? 52 Part of the answer may lie
41 See HousE Com. ON rE JuDiCIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., IMPEACHMENT,
SELECTED MATERIALS ON PROCEDURE 381-409 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter IMPEACH-
MENT, SELECTED MATERIALS ON PROCEDURE]; J. BoRyxN, supra note 16, at 198-99; P
HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note I1, at 207-20.
41 See, e.g., J. BopauN, supra note 16, at 100-01 (Judge Buffington).
- See 28 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
,8 See id. at § 372.
" See id. at § 294.
- See id. at § 376.
11 The actions a judicial council may take upon receipt of a report of a special
committee appointed to investigate a complaint include:
(ii) certifying disability of a judge appointed to hold office during
good behavior whose conduct is the subject of the complaint, pursuant to
the procedures and standards provided under subsection (b) of this section;
(iii) requesting that any such judge appointed to hold office during
good behavior voluntarily retire, with the provision that the length of service
requirements under section 371 of this title shall not apply;
(iv) ordering that, on a temporary basis for a time certain, no further
cases be assigned to any judge or magistrate whose conduct is the subject
of a complaint.
Id. at § 372(c)(6).
52 See J. BoRxKN, supra note 16, at 195.
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in the fact that, however ponderous, the constitutional arrange-
ments have provided a sufficiently credible threat to prompt
numerous federal judges to resign rather than risk impeachment
and removal. 53 Some of those individuals, apparently, saw the
shadow not of Jefferson's "scare-crow ' 54 but of Lord Bryce's
"hundred-ton gun." '5 5 The gun was in mothballs for fifty years.
It casts a shadow again.
D. The Criminal Process
Another part of the answer may lie in the influence of the
criminal process on decisions to resign. The proper place of that
process under current constitutional arrangements is a difficult
question and one that I explore later in this Essay 56 For the
present, it is enough to note that, even when the criminal pros-
ecution of a sitting federal judge was even rarer than it is today,
the efforts of exasperated public prosecutors helped to stimulate
some of the most corrupt federal judges to resign.57
E. The 1980 Act
What then about federal judges who misbehave but are not
corrupt, or at least not so corrupt as to attract the attention of
public prosecutors or the sustained attention of Congress? There's
53 See id. at 27-28, 120, 181, 195, 200-04, 219-58. Of course, even the innocent may
have concluded that the office was not worth the embarrassment and expense of impeach-
ment proceedings.
-, "For experience has already shown that the impeachment [the Constitution] has
provided is not even a scare-crow." Letter from Hon. Thomas Jefferson to Hon. Spencer
Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), reprinted in 10 THE WurnNos OF THOmAS JEMRSON 141 (P Ford
ed. 1899).
11 Impeachment is the heaviest piece of artillery in the congressional
arsenal, but because it is so heavy it is unfit for ordinary use. It is like a
hundred-ton gun which needs complex machinery to bring it into position,
an enormous charge of power to fire it, and a large mark to aim it.
I J. BRYcE, THE AMEsmcAN ComMoNwEALTH 283 (1888).
1" See infra text accompanying notes 102-38.
17 Two of the judges whose careers are chronicled by Borkin, United States Senior
Circuit Judge Martin Manton and United States District Judge Albert Johnson, were
probably influenced to resign both by the impeachment process and by the criminal
process. See J. BociuN, supra note 16, at 27-28, 181-83; see also 126 CONo. REc. 25,371
(1980) (statement of Rep. Rodino); J. BoaRxN, supra note 16, at 255-56 (United States
District Judge Winslow).
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the rub. Modern federal judicial administration dates from a
period of extraordinary public attention to problems of judicial
corruption. 8 But the powers given to the arms of federal judicial
administration, and in particular the judicial councils of the
circuits, were not well defined in 1939, and their capacity to
deal with judicial misbehavior remained in doubt for years. 59 A
1970 Supreme Court decision in a case brought to challenge the
exercise of those powers hardly resolved the doubts. 60 That was
one of the main goals of Congress in enacting the Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980.61
By clarifying the authority of the judiciary to consider com-
plaints of misconduct or disability and by providing a process
and procedural charter for such consideration, as well as a
partial but limiting enumeration of responsive actions, the 1980
Act fills a gaping hole in society's defense against the excesses
of life tenure. 62 If well and faithfully implemented, it can serve
as both credible supplement and credible alternative to the proc-
ess of impeachment and removal. In this case, "supplement"
and "alternative" are not euphemisms for replacement. Congress
attempted to ensure that the Act not supplant the constitutionally
prescribed process in matters of sufficient gravity to suggest the
need for it63 and that, in any event, it could not be used to
58 The judicial councils of the circuits were created by the Administrative Office
Act of 1939, ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223. See generally P FisH, Tim PO.ITICS OF FEDERAL
JuDIciAL ADmmsTRAToN 125-65, 379-426 (1973). For the link in the text, see id. at 114.
11 See Burbank, supra note 7, at 291-92, 294.
0 See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
" See H.R. REP. No. 1313, supra note 38, at 1, 7.
62 See generally Burbank, supra note 7; Burbank, The Federal Judicial Discipline
Act: Is Decentralized Self-Regulation Working?, 67 JuD=Truim 183 (1983-84); Burbank,
Politics and Progress in Implementing the Federal Judicial Discipline Act, 71 JuDIcATURE
13 (1987-88) [hereinafter Politics and Progress].
" (B) In any case in which the judicial council determines, on the basis of
a complaint and an investigation under this subsection, or on the basis of
information otherwise available to the council, that a judge appointed to
hold office during good behavior has engaged in conduct-
(i) which might constitute one or more grounds for impeachment
under article I of the Constitution; or
(ii) which, in the interest of justice, is not amenable to resolution
by the judicial council,
the judicial council shall promptly certify such determination, together with
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remove a federal judge. 64 Moreover, in cases of such gravity,
Congress hoped that proceedings under the Act would yield a
record that would measurably lighten the burden of exercising
its constitutional responsibilities. 65 In either situation, when al-
leged misconduct is not grounds for impeachment and removal
and when it may be, the Act can take the pressure off the
constitutionally prescribed process and cast a shadow of its own.
Whether it will be permitted to fulfill its potential, by the body
responsible for its passage, the bodies responsible for its imple-
mentation, or by the courts, are matters to which I shall return.
F Informal Approaches
Finally in this survey of current arrangements, it is important
to note the role of informal approaches to problems of miscon-
duct or disability in the federal judiciary At one time it was
probably the case that collegial or hierarchical suasion was the
most common and effective supplement to the impeachment
process, at least when the latter was not a credible threat.
6
Although the 1980 Act has tended to divert attention from
informal processes, Congress did not intend to supplant them.
any complaint and a record of any associated proceedings, to the Judicial
Conference of the United States.
(8) Upon referral or certification of any matter under paragraph (7)
of this subsection, the Judicial Conference, after consideration of the prior
proceedings and such additional investigation as it considers appropnate,
shall by majority vote take such action, as described in paragraph (6)(B) of
this subsection, as it considers appropriate. If the Judicial Conference
concurs in the determination of the council, or makes its own determination,
that consideration of impeachment may be warranted, it shall so certify and
transmit the determination and the records of proceedings to the House of
Representatives for whatever action the House of Representatives considers
to be necessary.
28 U.S.C. §§ 372(c)(7)(B) & (8) (1982).
6, The Act provides that "in no circumstances may the council order removal from
office of any judge appointed to hold office during good behavior." Id. at § 372(c)(6)B)(vii).
See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 28,097 (1980) (statement of Senator Thurmond);
Burbank, supra note 7, at 304 n.85.
See R. WiMELER & A. Lnvnr, JuDiciAL DisciLunE AN'D REMOVAL iN nor UrniED
STATES 9, 13-14, 74 (1979).
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Indeed, to the extent that the Act clarified the existence of
formal power, they should be stronger. 67
II. ADJUSTMENTS IN CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS
The transaction costs of a constitutional amendment are such
that, whatever the subject, that course should be pursued only
when it is clear that the problem cannot be addressed satisfac-
torily and at less cost by adjustments in current arrangements.
When the problem implicates an essential attribute of one branch
of the federal government, the error costs to be considered are
enormous, additional reason to proceed cautiously
It may not be fair to tax legislators who have recently pro-
posed constitutional amendments regarding federal judicial dis-
cipline with undue haste, as their proposals can be viewed as
merely vehicles for inviting the kind of broad-ranging and careful
comparative assessment that, I have argued, is necessary in light
of the stakes involved. To advance such an assessment, this
section will explore possible adjustments in current arrangements
that might make them more effective in dealing with the prob-
lems that have been identified. First, however, it is necessary to
state those problems.
Some of the recent proposals were animated by the sense
that, when a federal judge has been convicted of a felony and
has exhausted direct appeals but nevertheless refuses to resign,
the costs of the impeachment process are simply too great and
that a more efficient remedy is appropriate. 68 Some of the pro-
posals, however, proceed from the view that the costs of remov-
ing any federal judge, crimnally convicted or not, are too great
under current arrangements,6 9 and one of them purports to
derive support for the conclusion from the alleged ineffectiveness
61 See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 25,371 (1980) (statement of Rep. Rodino); id. at 28,092
(1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); Burbank, Politics and Progress, supra note 62, at
22; Fitzpatrick, Misconduct and Disability of Federal Judges: The Unreported Informal
Responses, 71 JUDICATURE 282 (1988).
6, See supra note 5; 132 CONG. REc. S7867 (daily ed. June 18, 1986) (statement of
Sen. DeConcini); Hearing on S.J. Res. 364 & S.J. Res. 370, supra note 5, at 30-31
(statement of Stephen B. Burbank).
0 See supra note 6; 132 CONG. REc. S4990-91 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1987) (statement
of Sen. Heflin); id. at S8746 (daily ed. June 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. DeConcmi).
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of the 1980 Act as a supplement to the constitutionally prescribed
process.7 0
In considering how current arrangements might be adjusted
to minimize costs, logic suggests starting with means to avoid
invocation of the impeachment process. That process, we have
seen, is the last defense against the excesses of life tenure. What
changes are possible in, or at least what questions should be
asked about, all lines of defense?
A. The Appointments Process
Criticisms of the appointments process tend to focus on the
means by which those involved in the process, formally and
informally, assess the intellectual and the experiential qualifica-
tions of potential and actual nominees.71 It may be that, recog-
nizing the limitations of even a skilled investigation of moral
character and fitness for judicial office, little room for improve-
ment exists in that aspect of current appointments practice. At
the least, however, it would be useful to confirm that back-
ground investigations are being conducted on all nominees to an
article III position, 72 that they are being conducted by skilled
70 See 132 CONG. REc. S8746 (daily ed. June 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. De-
Concini).
71 See S. Res. 459, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); 127 CONG. REc. S12,529-32 (daily
ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Sen. Specter); ABA Takes Heat on Hill over Rating of
Bork, Nat'l. L.J., Oct. 5, 1987, at 5.
72 Those who find this question silly should endeavor to answer it. I have been told
by a confidential source, but have been unable to verify, that something was badly armss
in the background work on Harry Claiborne. If that is true, the Senate should have
spared us the hand-wnnging about his impeachment trial.
At the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on Claiborne's nomination, the following
was the full extent of questioning:
Senator DeConcim. Thank you. Have you made a full financial disclosure
to the Department of Justice?
Mr. Claiborne. Yes, I have.
Senator DeConcii. And have you received a questionnaire from Senator
Mathias?
Mr. Claiborne. Yes sir; I have, and I have answered them.
Senator DeConcim. Do you hold any positions in or are you a member of
any board of directors of any corporations?
Mr. Claiborne. I do not.
Senator DeConcim. Thank you. I have no further questions.
Nominations of Harry E. Claiborne, et al.. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
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investigators, and that the latter are pursuing appropriate ave-
nues of inquiry, with appropriate thoroughness. To what extent
are those conducting the investigations expected or permitted to
provide a record not just about moral character and fitness but
also about intellectual ability9 If they do pursue both lines of
inquiry, is the practice likely to dinmsh the effectiveness of the
investigation as to both because it precludes the investigators'
full attention to either, including by skewing the sample of those
consulted?73 These and other questions about the information
available to those involved in the appointments process should
be explored both from a normative perspective and with the
benefit of analysis of the pre-appointment material on federal
judges of recent notoriety, to the extent such material exists. 74
B. Retirement and Disability Statutes
Although current statutes regarding retirement, disability,
senior status, and annuities appear, at last, adequate to remove
the main incentive for a physically or mentally disabled judge
to remain on the bench after his time, it would be a simple task
to confirm that fact with those most likely to be aware of any
problems, the chief judges of the district courts and of the courts
of appeals. Moreover, because financial incentives do not ex-
haust the possible reasons for continuation in active service, the
proposed inquiry should include an assessment of the effective-
Judicary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1978) (transcript), pnnted in RPORT OF THE SENATE
IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE: HEARINGS ON THE IMPEACHMENT OF HARRY E. CLAs-
BORNE, JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF
NEVADA, OF HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS BEFORE THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL
Comm., S. HRG. RrP. No. 812, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2259 (1986) [hereinafter REPORT OF
THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE],
For criticisms of the confirmation process and suggested improvements, see, e.g.,
Jost, No More Assembly-Line Nominations, Legal Times, Nov. 16, 1987, at 16. For
recent essays on that process with regard to appointments to the Supreme Court, see
Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 101 HARv. L. REV, 1146 (1988).
7- These questions are prompted by my expenence in an mterview with an FBI
agent regarding an individual who was subsequently confirmed as an article III ju~lge.
Most of the interview consisted of questions attempting to probe the individual's views
about law and politics. Very few of them, and those presented by the agent as pro forma,
concerned moral character and fitness.
7" See supra note 72.
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ness of the 1980 Act in helping the federal judiciary with the
painful business of bearing bad news.7 -
C. The 1980'Act
The 1980 Act was not addressed primarily to the problem of
the disabled judge, and its effectiveness in helping to remedy
and to deter misconduct is a critical question to be addressed in
a comparative assessment of the sort advocated here. Happily,
there is already a good deal of information available that bears
on that question, and it is possible to hazard some answers as
well as pose some additional questions.
Contrary to the assertions of a senator who has sought to
use the alleged ineffectiveness of the 1980 Act as support for a
constitutional amendment to implement a wholly new system for
remedying misconduct, including by removal, the record of the
federal judiciary under that Act has hardly been one of "inac-
tivity "76 Since October 1981, when the Act became effective,
1153 complaints have been filed, of which forty-seven remained
pending on June 30, 1987 77 It is true that chief judges have
dismissed most of the complaints filed under the Act, but that
was to be expected, and Congress did expect it.78 As an interested
and relatively well-informed student of the Act and its imple-
mentation, I have seen no evidence that those charged with
responsibilities in the process of complaint disposition have failed
in the exercise of those responsibilities. The information pres-
ently available suggests that the Act is working and that the
explanation for the small number of complaints that have re-
quired investigation and the even smaller number that hive
required action by a judicial council lies in the generally high
7' The inquiry should include both formal and informal actions. As to the former,
see In re the Complaint Against a District Judge Under 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (3d Cir.
Judicial Council 1982) (order requesting disabled judge to retire voluntarily under 28
U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(B)(iii)) (copy on file with the author).
,6 132 CONG. Rnc. S8746 (daily ed. June 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. DeConcini);
see Burbank, Politics & Progress, supra note 62, at 22.
n See 1987 Anam'. OFincE OF THE U.S. CouRTs ANN. RaP. OF THE DIRECTOR 92-
95.
, -See Burbank, supra note 7, at 322.
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quality of the federal bench.79 Support for an alternative expla-
nation, if it exists, will only be found after a detailed analysis
of complaints and their disposition. That will require hard work
rather than easy assertion; it may even require a statutory
amendment.8 0
It is also not true, as asserted by the same senator, that the
judicial councils "have not even come up with rules and guide-
lines for the conduct of their operations,''81 although their ef-
forts in that regard have been the object of criticism.8 2 Most of
the cnticisms may soon be moot, as the councils respond to the
Judicial Conference's recommendation that they substantially
adopt, on an experimental basis, illustrative rules prepared by a
special subcommittee of the Conference of Chief Judges of the
Court of Appeals."3 The illustrative rules provide answers, usu-
ally sensible answers, to most of the procedural questions un-
certainty about which was harmful to Congress' goal of improving
public accountability while protecting the independence of fed-
eral judges. Moreover, if most of the councils adopt them in
substantial part, as recommended by the Conference, the answers
will be substantially uniform, with a consequent reduction in the
costs of disumformity to the attainment of Congress' goals.8 4
Apart from the uninformed assertions of an unreconstructed
proponent of another scheme, perceptions of the Act's effec-
tiveness have been adversely affected by two developments, one
discrete and easily addressed, the other more widespread and
more intractable.
Some members of Congress were evidently unhappy that,
once Judge Claiborne had exhausted direct appeals from his
79 See Burbank, Politics and Progress, supra note 62, at 22. As noted there, "the
statistics do not give a clear picture of the role that informal adjustments play, either
after a complaint has been filed-chief judges have concluded 37 proceedings under the
Act on the ground that appropriate corrective action had been taken-or in the absence
of a formal complaint." Id. See also Fitzpatrick, supra note 67.
- See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14) (1982) (confidentiality of "[a]ll papers, documents,
and records of proceedings related to investigations" with limited exceptions); see also
Burbank, Politics and Progress, supra note 62, at 20-21.
" 132 CONG. Rtc. S8746 (daily ed. June 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
See Burbank, supra note 7, at 309-46.
83 The text of the illustrative rules is reprinted in Burbank, Politics and Progress,
supra note 62, at 23-28.
14 See id. at 15-22.
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felony conviction, the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit did
not more promptly invoke a section of the Act providing for a
certification of a determination that an article III judge "has
engaged in conduct which might constitute one or more
grounds for impeachment under article I (sic) of the Constitu-
tion." '85 I have explored elsewhere possible reasons for the delay
and pointed out that, in any event, the certification process is a
mere formality in a case like Judge Claiborne's, which was
notorious and the factual underpinnings of which were fully
developed in a court record. 6 It is not clear, in other words,
whether members of Congress had good reason to be unhappy,
and the experience is hardly evidence of the ineffectiveness of
the Act generally The certification process has been used twice
again;87 rules adopted by the Judicial Conference at its Septem-
ber 1987 meeting should help, 8 and if need be, any remaining
problems can be addressed by statutory amendment. 89
A more serious threat to the effectiveness of the 1980 Act,
which depends in consequential measure on perceptions of its
effectiveness, arises from continuing uncertainty about its con-
stitutionality Just as some members of Congress continue to
believe that, as a compromise, the legislation did not go far
enough, others, in Congress and out, believe that it went too
far The broadest attack argues that the impeachment process is
the exclusive means not only to remove an article III judge but
to constrain such a judge in the exercise of the duties of office
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(7)(B) (1982), quoted in full supra note 63.
"See Hearing on S.J. Res. 364 & S.J. Res. 370, supra note 5, at 32-33 (statement
of Stephen B. Burbank); see also Burbank, Politics and Progress, supra note 62, at 22
n.l13.
. See Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 96-97
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W 3715 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1988) (Judge Hastings);
Rodino Announces Impeachment Inquiry, supra note 4 (Judge Nixon).
u See Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States for the Processing of
Certificates from Judicial Councils That a Judicial Officer Has Engaged in Conduct That
Might Constitute Grounds for Impeachment, 1987 Reports of the Proceedings of the
Judicial Conference of the United States 97-99 (Waslungton, D.C. Mar. 17, 1987 & Sept.
21, 1987).
- See H.R. 4393, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(d) (1988) (proposing special trans-
mittal process in case of judge or magistrate convicted of felony who has exhausted direct
appeals); Hearing on S.J. Res. 364 & S.J. Re. 370, supra note 5, at 33 (statement of
Stephen B. Burbank).
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for reasons of alleged misconduct or disability 90 Narrower at-
tacks may focus on a particular constraint authorized by the
Act, on the procedures specified therein or those actually em-
ployed for complaint disposition, on the certification process,
or for that matter, on a host of other provisions or practices. 91
There is little that can or should be done to prevent attacks
on the 1980 Act, whether they take the form of commentary in
journals or pleadings in a lawsuit. 92 Those who are disturbed by,
as well as those making, such attacks should recall that most of
the issues currently being raised were aired with unusual thor-
oughness during the long legislative process yielding the ultimate
compromise and that the framers of that legislation were unu-
sually candid and careful in attempting to meet and to resolve
constitutional objections. 93 Until such time as the Supreme Court
authoritatively holds to the contrary, we should assume that they
were successful. Indeed, this may be a subject about which
responsible members of Congress should be sufficiently con-
cerned to monitor the quality of the defense of its efforts in any
litigation challenging their constitutionality
For those who believe that the constitutional provisions re-
garding article III judges are "underdeterminate" 94-in the pres-
ent climate, a population that probably is growing-it may be
See, e.g., 126 CoNG. REc. 28,093-97 (1980) (statement of Sen. Matias); Note,
supra note 30.
1 See, e.g., Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 657 F Supp. 672
(D.D.C. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 829 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
56 U.S.L.W 3715 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1988); Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United
States, 593 F Supp. 1371 (D.D.C. 1984), affd in part and vacated in part, 770 F.2d
1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986).
92 But see 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10) (1982) ("Except as expressly provided in this
paragraph, all orders and determinations, including demals of petitions for review, shall
be final and conclusive and shall not be judicially reviewable on appeal or otherwise.").
In remanding some of Judge Hastings' due process claims, the court of appeals noted
that "sensitive and unsettled questions of constitutional law would arise if the challenged
actions are covered by the prohibition of judicial review." Hastings v. Judicial Conference
of the Umted States, 829 F.2d 91, 108 n.69 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W
3715 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1988).
11 See H.R. RaP. No. 1313, supra note 38, at 2-5, 16-19; Burbank, supra note 7,
at 291-300; Kastenmeier and Remington, Judicial Discipline: A Legislative Perspctive, 76
Ky. L.J. 763, 771-73 (1987-88) [hereinafter Kastenmeier].
1" See Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. Cii.
L. REv 462, 473 (1987).
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appropriate to note that the major compromises in the 1980 Act
were in favor of judicial independence95 and that, when the
vehicle of change is a constitutional amendment, two-hundred-
year-old bets are off.
The last is also fair comment to those in the federal judiciary,
whether originally opponents of the 1980 legislation or just the
reluctant recipients of the workload it imposes, who wish that
it would go away Indeed, because federal judges are an impor-
tant part of the legal climate, we may expect that some of them
would include consideration of alternatives in deciding, as judges,
what the Constitution permits, even if they would not admit it.96
The pressing need at this point is for authoritative resolu-
tion(s) of constitutional attacks on the 1980 Act. That there has
been no such resolution to date has not been for lack of effort
by Judge Hastings, an individual who was intensely and person-
ally interested in upsetting proceedings under the Act before they
upset him.97 Some of the grounds of attack have been rejected
by the courts that considered them; a number have been deferred
and may never be reached at his instance. 98 Perhaps the deferrals
were justified, although in future cases, courts may wish to
consider whether continued deferrals will yield no review and
whether the chill to the Act's effectiveness bred by continuing
11 See Burbank, supra note 7, at 283-84, 291-308.
1 For a sense of the alternatives, see supra note 20. We may also expect that judges
would be aware of if not influenced by the fact that the 1980 legislation was based on a
bill approved by the Judicial Conference. See Burbank, supra note 7, at 300.
91 In addition to the cases cited supra note 91, see Williams v. Mercer, 610 F Supp.
169 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub. nom. In re Certain Complaints
Under Investigation by an Investigating Comm. of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh
Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488 (1Ith Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Hastings v. Godbold, 106 S.
Ct. 3273 (1986); In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials, 576 F Supp.
1275 (S.D. Fla. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1261 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied sub. noin. Hastings
v. Investigating Comm. of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 469 U.S. 884
(1984); cf. United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied,
704 F.2d 559 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983); United States v. Hastings,
681 F.2d 706 (l1th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 689 F.2d 192 (lth Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983).
The change of venue to the House of Representatives has not deterred Judge
Hastings. See In Re Grand Jury Proceedings of Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Miami), 669 F
Supp. 1072 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1438 (lth Cir. 1987); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 841 F.2d 1048 (11th Cir. 1988).
" See, e.g., Hastings, 829 F.2d at 91; Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United
States, 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986).
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uncertainty about the constitutionality of one or more of its
provisions renders passivity no longer virtuous. 99 At the least,
one would hope not to see again a supposed exercise in passivity
the effect if not the purpose of which is to create such a chill. 1°0
When there has been authoritative resolution of the consti-
tutional questions raised by the 1980 Act's detractors, and unless
the result of that resolution is to adopt the position of those
making the broadest attack-a result I deem extremely improb-
able-any defects m the Act can be corrected by amendments.
In the meantime, Congress should give the Act a chance to work
as it was intended to work. That means both refraining from
unsupported attacks on its implementation by the federal judi-
ciary in garden variety matters and focusing close attention on
the fruits of its process in matters that reach the impeachment
market. Congress should also correct by amendment defects that
have been identified in the oversight process but that are not of
constitutional significance.101
D. The Criminal Process
We have seen that criminal investigations played a role in
persuading some federal judges to resign. 102 More recently, we
have twice witnessed the failure of a crminal conviction, af-
firmed on appeal, to have that effect. 03 The proper role of
criminal law enforcement in society's defense against judicial
misbehavior is a difficult and important question, whether ap-
9 Compare A. Bicica, Tim LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962) ("The Passive
Virtues") with Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUm. L. Ray. 1 (1964).
-- See Hastings, 770 F.2d at 1104-11 (Edwards, J., concurrng).
101 See H.R. 4393, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1988); Oversight Hearing, supra
note 8, at 33-36 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank); Kastenmeier, supra note 93, at 781-89.
The provisions in the Act that seem to me most vulnerable to constitutional challenge
are section 372(c)(6)(iv), quoted supra note 51, and section 372(c)(7)(B), quoted supra
note 63. The problem with the latter could be solved if the words "has engaged" were
changed to "may have engaged," as proposed in H.R. 4393, supra.
"0 See supra text accompanying note 57.
"I Representative Sensenbrenner listed a "number of dubious distinctions that [Judge]
Claiborne achieved," including that he was "the first sitting Federal Judge in [our]
history to go to pnson." 132 CONG. REc. H4718 (daily ed. July 22, 1986). Judge Nixon
is the second. See supra note 4.
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proached from the relatively formal perspective of constitutional
law or from the perspective of wise public policy
As to constitutional law, this is another matter on which we
would benefit from authoritative guidance, although the number
of criminal prosecutions of federal judges in recent years suggests
that federal prosecutors are not deterred by the absence of a
Supreme Court holding on the constitutionality of prosecuting
Or imprisomng a sitting federal judge./°4 Because, however, the
lower court decisions on the question may not persuade' 5 and
because a comparative assessment of the sort advocated in this
Essay should consider the future of criminal prosecutions, as
well as their past, it may be useful to attempt to confine the
field of debate.
As a matter of constitutional law, the prosecution of a
federal judge before that individual had been removed pursuant
to the impeachment process might be thought to violate article
I, section 3, clause 7 That clause provides that
fj]udgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further
than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United
States: but the Party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable
and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment,
according to Law 106
The imprisonment of a sitting federal judge ight be thought
to violate both that provision and article n, section 4, which
provides that "[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Of-
114 There is, however, dictum to support the prosecutors. See United States v. Lee,
106 .U.S, 196, 220 (1882) (dictum); see also Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth
Circuit, 398 U.S, 74, 140 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 141-42 (Black, J., dissenting);
cf. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972) (rejecting senator's claim that
speech or debate clause precluded prosecution).
10d gee United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
829 (1984); Hastings, 681 F.2d at 706; United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
This part of my work was prompted by student work-m-progress that has now been
published. See Note, In Defense of the Constitution's Judicial Impeachment Standard,
86 MIcH. L. REv. 420 (1988). I am grateful to the author of that note, Ms. Melissa
Maxman, for sharing drafts with me and hopeful that, although we disagree, our exchange
of views has been as stimulating for her as it has for me.
310 For other relevant provisions, see supra note 1.
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ficers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
The formal constitutional argument against prosecution be-
fore removal through the impeachment process would impute to
the language, "but the Party convicted shall, nevertheless, be
liable and subject to [criminal proceedings]," an intent by the
framers and ratifiers of the Constitution to establish a strict
order of precedence.
As a matter of language, the words almost certainly should
not be read that way Their context demonstrates that the people
who wrote them were concerned lest a person "convicted" be
able to abort criminal prosecution by invoking common law
principles of double jeopardy and that their words were designed
to meet that specific case. 10 7 As Raoul Berger has pointed out,
"nevertheless" means "in spite of" not "afterwards."' ' 08 Nev-
ertheless, because the provision in question does refer to one
who has been "convicted," and although the context dictated
that choice, a linguistic inquiry is perhaps not decisive.
Professor Berger sought support for his view that indictment
and trial (even of a president) may precede removal by resorting
to English practice, noting that "[o]n several occasions the Par-
liament preferred to refer the case to the courts."' 9 This is not
helpful because, as Berger himself elsewhere recognized, in Eng-
lish practice "criminal punishment and removal were wedded in
one proceeding, '"" 0 whereas the framers made an informed de-
cision to divorce them.
107 The purpose of the clause as a whole was to specify the limits of a judgment of
conviction following a Senate trial and in particular to implement the framers' intent to
depart from the English practice of conflating the impeachment process and the cnminal
process. See infra text accompanying notes 116-19. The sentence in question, making
clear that those limits did not include immunity from criminal prosecution, used the
words, "the Party convicted," because those were the words that the larger context
required.
" Berger, The President, Congress, and the Courts, 83 YALE L.J. 1111, 1128 (1973-
74).
" Id. at 1126.
110 Id. at 1124. "Berger has written a brief, not a history. Missing from his work is
an appreciation of American colomal and state precedents, the latter of which were far
more important in influencing federal law than English examples." P Ho=FER & N.
HuLL, supra note 11, at 268.
1987-88]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
If we turn to contemporary interpretations of the Constitu-
tion, we find the matter still in doubt. There are at least two
passages in The Federalist which suggest that the author contem-
plated removal before criminal prosecution, if he did not regard
the order as a constitutional command."' The author was Al-
exander Hamilton. Although I would not join Professor Berger
in dismissing Hamilton's views as those of a person whose
"participation in the Convention was sporadic and had little, if
any, influence,"" 2 it Is perhaps relevant that Hamilton's own
plan provided that a president be removed and "be afterwards
tried & punished.""' 3 In addition to Hamilton's views, which are
ambiguous and may reflect the holding power of one's own
ideas, we have the evidence from the state ratifying conventions,
which has something for both sides of this debate." 4
In such a state of affairs, it may be useful to consider both
the logical and practical consequences of the argument. If a
federal judge must be "convicted" and thus removed before he
or she can be prosecuted, a judge who has been impeached but
who is not, for whatever reason, convicted cannot be prosecuted.
Rather than belittle an interpretation of the Constitution that
would lead, in such a case, to "complete and permanent
immunity from criminal prosecution, '""5 I prefer to pose a ques-
The pumshment which may be the consequence of conviction upon im-
peachment, is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender. After
having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and con-
fidence, and honors and emoluments of his country, he will still be liable
to prosecution and pumshment in the ordinary course of law.
THE FERRAisT No. 65, supra note 42, at 20 (A. Hamilton); see id. No. 77, at 97.
112 Berger, supra note 108, at 1127.
M1 3 Farrand, supra note 34, at 625. Berger asserts that Hamilton's plan "was not
considered by the Convention." Berger, supra note 108, at 1127. This may be misleading.
Hamilton read to the delegates a sketch of his plan of government. See I Farrand, supra
note 34, at 291-93. Moreover, "[a]lthough [his] plan was not formally before the Con-
vention m any way, several of the delegates made copies." 3 id. at 617.
114 See Catz, Removal of Federal Judges by Imprisonment, 18 RuTOERS L.J. 103,
104-05 n.10 (1986-87).
"I Memorandum for the United States at 9-10, Application of Spiro T. Agnew,
Civil No. 73-965 (D. Md.), quoted in Berger, supra note 108, at 1133. In arguing that
"impeachment never immunizes the individual from criminal proceedings," Note, supra
note 105, at 442, a recent commentator neglects differences between the purposes and
reach of the impeachment process and the criminal process and thus neglects the possibility
of immunity arising from the Senate's failure to convict.
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tion. Is it possible that, in a provision designed to eliminate
double jeopardy principles as a potential bar to the criminal
prosecution (and pumshment) of one convicted and removed
through the impeachment process, the framers sought to bring,
or inadvertently did bring, the same principles in through the
back door, so as to protect one who has not been removed
("convicted") from criminal prosecution?
Obviously, I intend the question as rhetorical, but the im-
plications of the answer for other permutations in the order of
precedence suggest the wisdom of elaboration. As noted above,
the Constitution breaks from the English practice of making the
impeachment process an all purpose affair, at the end of which
the individual might lose not only his office but his head. 116 The
arguments for distinguishing conduct that may be criminal from
conduct warranting impeachment and removal are, at least for
me, compelling.1 7 These arguments are confirmed by the view
of early and distinguished commentators that the impeachment
process and the criminal process serve different purposes, albeit
the jurisdictions sometimes overlap." 8 In such a scheme, prin-
ciples of double jeopardy have no role to play 119 Just as conduct
need not be criminal to justify impeachment and removal, so
the fact that conduct does not justify impeachment and removal
does not mean that it is not crimanal.' 2o It is inconceivable to
me, as it was to Justice Story, that the framers intended to bar
the prosecution of one impeached but not convicted and thus
"' See, e.g., P HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 11, at 1-14; 2 J. SToRY, supra note
37, §§ 780-83; W RAWLE, supra note 37, at 206-07.
M7 See, e.g., C. BLACK, ImPEAcHmENT: A HANDBOOK 25-41 (1974); Comm. on Fed.
Legislation, The Law of Presidential Impeachment, 19 REc. A.B. Crry N.Y. 154, 155-58
(1974) [hereinafter The Law of Impeachment]. Professor Black supported (without elab-
orating) "the contention that an incumbent president cannot be put on trial in the
ordinary courts for ordinary crime." C. BLACK, supra, at 40. But see Berger, supra note
108.
" See, e.g., THE FEDERA=LST No. 65 (A. Hamilton); W RAWj.a, supra note 37, at
198-208; 2 J. STORY, supra note 37, at §§ 744-45, 747-48, 759, 762-64, 780-84, 788, 794-
95, 799, 810; 1 Tam WoRKs OF Jams WasoN, supra note 34, at 324, 426.
"I See, e.g., 2 J. STORY, supra note 37, at §§ 779-84. This is not to say, however,
that such principles would be inapplicable to an attempted impeachment of a person
previously tried by the Senate. See id. at § 806.
'1 See supra text accompanying note 117.
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inconceivable that the Constitution should be read to require
removal before prosecution.1 21
The second line of attack on criminal prosecution before
removal is both narrower and broader than the first. It is nar-
rower because, at least in discriminating hands, it distinguishes
between prosecution and conviction, on the one hand, and im-
prisonment on the other. 22 It is broader because, of necessity,
the argument must quickly depart the text of the Constitution.
Such an argument, like the idea of equality, "[o]nce loosed
is not easily cabined."' 123
In whatever hands, the attack requires acceptance of the
proposition that the constitutionally prescribed impeachment
process is the exclusive means to remove a federal judge from
office. As indicated above, I accept that proposition, finding it
either asserted or assumed by early commentators and confirmed
by the verdict of history 124
Even if one were persuaded that imprisonment, or impns-
onment for a long period, was tantamount to removal and thus
constitutionally proscribed, the conclusion would not follow that
the criminal process is irrelevant in considering adjustments in
current arrangements. If the constitutional problem inheres only
in the sentence, it should be possible, with suitable amendments
to Title 18,2- to postpone the execution of a sentence of con-
finement until such time, if ever, as a convicted judge is im-
121 See 2 J. STORY supra note 37, at §§ 779-85. "But the ordinary tribunals are
not precluded, either before or after an impeachment, from taking cognizance of the
public and official delinquency." W RAwLE, supra note 37, at 204; see 2 Tim DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF TE FEDERAL CONSTITTON
477 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) (James Wilson opining to the Pennsylvania Convention that
"[tihough they may not be convicted on impeachment before the Senate, they may be
tned by their country.").
122 Although rejecting Judge Hastings' attempt to quash the indictment against him,
the court of appeals did "not address whether or under what circumstances an extended
sentence of imprisonment might approach in substance removal from office." Hastings,
681 F.2d at 712 n.19. See United States v. Claiborne, 790 F.2d 1355, 1356-58 (9th Cir.
1986) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Note, supra note 105,
at 425-26.
I Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
80 HARv. L. REv 91, 91 (1966-67).
124 See supra text accompanying notes 35-38, 108.
121 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551, 3553, 3561-64 (Supp. III 1985).
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peached and removed.'2 As developed below, the record of the
criminal trial could measurably diminish the burdens of the
impeachment process,127 and a legislative time limit on the du-
ration of any postponement might serve as an additional incen-
tive to Congress to proceed with dispatch. If Congress did not
view the condpict undergirding the conviction as an impeachable
offense, the judge could go free-as free as anyone who escapes
confinement but not the rigors of the process that may lead to
it-and prosecutors would know that not every confirmed pec-
cadillo of a federal judge would result in an empty bench, even
temporarily
I am not, however, persuaded that imprisonment of a federal
judge pursuant to a judgment of conviction, even for a long
term, would constitute "removal from office" under an appro-
priate constitutional analysis. I support functional analysis just
as it supports me, 2 8 and once the notion of "removal from
office" is freed from its constitutional context, I admit that it
is as hard to defend imprisonment of a federal judge as it is to
defend the failure to reimburse an embattled federal judge for
legal expenses against a claim of diminished compensation. 29
But what I have called the constitutional context is as clear for
one as it is for the other In the case of "removal from office,"
the framers had in mind the formal termination of a commission
or of tenure in office. 30 Yes, they were concerned about judicial
' Cf. C. BLACK, supra note 117, at 40-41 (suggesting indictment and delay of trial
of incumbent president on assumptions that latter may not be tried while holding office
and that crime charged not an impeachable offense).
I" See infra text accompanying notes 178-88, 230-32.
lu See Hazard, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 1284, 1289 (1977-78).
119 Cf. Hastings, 829 F.2d at 103 (finding lack of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as to claim that failure to pay or to reimburse expenses incurred in proceedings
under 1980 Act constituted diminution of compensation prohibited by art. III, § I).
I" See THs FEDERALisT No. 65, supra note 42, at 20 (A. Hamilton); td. No. 77, at
97; d. No. 79, at 108-09; 2 Farrand, supra note 34, at 64-69; see also W RAwLE, supra
note 37, at 207 ("They [courts of law] can neither remove nor disqualify the person
convicted, and therefore the obnoxious officer might be continued in power and the
injury sustained by the nation be renewed or increased."); id. at 208 ("A commission
granted during good behavior can only be revoked by this mode of proceeding."); 2 J.
STORY, supra note 37, § 782, at 251 ("In England, the judgment upon impeachments is
not confined to mere removal from office; but extends to the whole punishment attached
by law to the offense."); id. at § 784 ("In the ordinary course of the administration of
criminal justice, no court is authorized to remove, or disqualify an offender, as a part
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independence, and yes, the Constitution should be interpreted
so as to accommodate situations unforeseen or unforeseeable in
1787 1 But criminal proceedings were not a threat to judicial
independence unknown to the framers, and, I have argued, they
were not a threat the framers deemed serious enough to fore-
close. I conclude, therefore, that a federal judge can be both
prosecuted and imprisoned without prior resort to the impeach-
ment process.
This does not mean that, as citizens, we should not be
concerned about the threat that unrestrained prosecution of fed-
eral judges would pose to their independence. Over the long
term, prosecutors seem to have entered the scene only in extreme
cases, 132 although recently there have been charges of prosecu-
tonal abuse.1 33 In general, there are institutional considerations
and safeguards that would tend to reign in zealous federal in-
vestigators and prosecutors"34 and numerous formal safeguards
available to federal judges as "ordinary citizens.' ' 35 Moreover,
even if federal trial and appellate judges cannot always be counted
on to see the forest of judicial independence for an unpopular
tree,'3 6 that they would usually do so seems a fair assumption.
I can think of no reason why an individual federal judge should
have different (i.e., additional) defenses to an indictment, once
returned, than does an ordinary citizen. Surely the Justice De-
partment should not ignore the word of an informant that a
federal judge is on the take; nor, in my view, should it rest.-
content with civil remedies for the income tax evasion of a
federal judge, as it might of a janitor. But these are matters for
of its regular judgment. If it results at all, it results as a consequence, and not as a part
of the sentence."); 1 TiE WORKS OF JAMES WisoN, supra note 34, at 325-26.
"I The framers did consider and reject one form of "temporary removal," but it
too would have been a formal action, proposed in a motion "that persons impeached be
suspended from their office until they be tried and acquitted." 2 Farrand, supra note 34,
at 612.
332 See supra text accompanying notes 57, 102-04.
"I See, e.g., United States v. Clalborne, 765 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1636 (1986); see also infra text accompanying notes 185-88.
,"4 See Weingarten, Judicial Misconduct: A View from the Department of Justice,
76 Ky. L.J. 799, 804-05 (1987-88).
33 Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 848.
136 Cf. H.R. REi. No. 1313, supra note 38, at 14 (means to prevent "one group of
federal judges arbitrarily 'ganging up' [on] or 'hazing' another judge").
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policymaking, and they may be a subject for congressional in-
quiry
Neither of the institutional considerations mentioned above
is fair ground for assumption in prosecutions under state law.
That is a matter deserving of discrete historical mquiry 137 and
constitutional analysis.
Let us assume that federal investigators and prosecutors
pursue possible violations of federal criminal law by article III
judges with circumspection and awareness of the potential costs
of an erroneous exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In consid-
enng adjustments in current arrangements, the question becomes
whether it is possible to enhance the usefulness of the criminal
process without affording irrelevant incentives to the enforce-
ment of crminal laws against federal judges.
I believe that it is possible to enhance the usefulness of the
criminal process to the impeachment process by adopting rules
or practices in the House, and perhaps in the Senate, that accord
substantial preclusive effect to factual findings necessary to a
criminal conviction once that conviction has been affirmed on
appeal. The matter is best discussed, however, in connection
with adjustments in the impeachment process and will be de-
ferred to that point. 138
I also believe that automatically according preclusive effect
either to factual findings or to a conviction per se would intro-
duce irrelevant incentives to the enforcement of criminal laws
against federal judges and, for that and other reasons, should
be avoided. Again, the matter is best discussed in the context in
which decisions on it will be made, and it is to that context that
I now turn.
E. The Impeachment Process
Before discussing possible adjustments in the current arrange-
ments for impeachment and trial, it is important to state and
UI Judge Manton's downfall came as a result of a state criminal investigation,
although he was prosecuted by federal authorities. According to Joseph Borkin, "District
Attorney [Thomas E.] Dewey made it abundantly clear that if the Federal government
would not act under Federal criminal statutes, he would proceed under state law." J.
BortiN, supra note 16, at 28.
I See infra text accompanying notes 178-84, 230-32.
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briefly to defend a few premises or assumptions from which the
discussion proceeds.
I assume, because I have been convinced, that most questions
of substance arising in connection with an impeachment inquiry
by the House or a trial on articles of impeachment by the Senate
are not subject to judicial review Again, the verdict of history
weighs heavily 119 Moreover, the arguments to the contrary' 40
have been exhaustively, and in my view convincingly, refuted. 141
Only one set of arguments, based on relatively recent authority,
deserves attention here.
Whatever one thinks of Powell v McCormack,142 it is hard
to imagine a more "textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment '14 of the exclusive power to determine matters of
substance than the Constitution's commitment to the House of
Representatives of "the sole Power of Impeachment,"'" and to
the Senate of "the sole Power to try all Impeachments.' ' 141
Moreover, the evidence of the framers' intent to pretermit the
involvement of the courts in the process not only supports that
conclusion; 146 it also supports the conclusion that on matters of
substance the process requires decisions for which there is "a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards" and
39 Apparently the only attempt to secure judicial review of the impeachment process
in our history was unsuccessful. Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293 (1936), cert.
denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937). Early commentators on the Constitution asserted or assumed
that there was no judicial appeal from, or review of, the impeachment process. See W
RAwLE, supra note 37, at 208; 2 J. SToRY, supra note 37, at §§ 764, 803.
110 See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 35, 103-21.
141 See, e.g., C. BLACK, supra note 117, at 53-63; Goldstein, Memorandum III on
the Effect of the End of a Congress and Start of a New Congress on a Pending
Impeachment Proceeding: Judicial Review of These Questions, in SENATE Comm. ON
RuLEs AND ADMINISTRATION, 93D CONG., 2D Sss., IMPEACHMENT: MiscEL.ANaous Doc-
UMENTS 167-204 (Comm. Pnnt 1974) [hereinafter IMPEACHMENT: MISCELLAmNous Docu-
MENTS]; The Law of Impeachment, supra note 117, at 167-70; Goldberg, An Essay on
Raoul Berger's Thesis for Judicial Intervention in the Process of the Removal of the
President of the United States, 1975 WISCONsin L. REv 414.
.42 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
,4' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see Powell, 395 U.S. at 518-48.
'" U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2.
141 Id. at § 3.
,,6 See Tir FEDERALiST No. 65 (A. Hamilton); 2 Farrand, supra note 34, at 500,
551; Eilberg, The Investigation by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives into the Charges of Impeachable Conduct Against Richard M. Nixon, 48
TEMPLE L.Q. 209, 230-31 (1975).
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some of which necessarily involve "an initial policy determina-
tion of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." 147 Perhaps
there could or should be judicial review of a decision to impeach
or to remove a federal judge for conduct (or inaction) that was
avowedly not considered "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors"' 148 by the House or Senate, but that will
presumably never occur.
As to matters of procedure, the question is more compli-
cated. The Constitution's textual commitment to each House of
the discretion to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings,' '1 49
lacks the word "sole" and in that respect is similar to the
companion provision that "[e]ach House shall be the Judge of
the . Qualifications of its own Members,"'' 5s which was at
issue in Powell. It has long been clear in other contexts that,
when rules of Congress or of its committees are supported only
by reference to this provision of the Constitution, such rules are
"judicially cogmzable,'' although judicial scrutiny (as opposed
to construction) is limited to consistency with the Constitution
and preservation of fundamental rights. 1 2
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see Powell, 395 U.S. at 548-49.
The necessity of a numerous court for the trial of impeachments, is equally
dictated by the nature of the proceeding. This can never be tied down by
such stnct rules, either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors,
or in the construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve tO limit
the discretion of courts in favor of personal security The awful discre-
tion which a court of impeachments must necessarily have, o doom to
honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most distinguished char-
acters of the community, forbids the commitment of the trust to a small
number of persons.
TiE FEDERAST No. 65, supra note 42, at 19 (A. Hamilton); see W, RAwiE, supra note
37, at 201-03; 2 J. STORY, supra note 37, at §§ 743-73, 784; 1 Tim WoRKS oF JAMES
WILSON, supra note 34, at 324.
"I U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. The same may be true of an attempt to extend a
judgment beyond "removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States," the limits stated id. at art. I,
§ 3, cl. 7.
In this discussion, I assume a federal court with subject matter jurisdiction. But see
C. BLACK, supra note 117, at 55,61.
U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
Id. at cl. 1.
" Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114 (1963).
S See United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932); United States v. Ballin, 144
U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
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In the impeachment context, the Constitution contains a
number of specific procedural requirements for a Senate trial,
disregard of which perhaps should be reviewable by a federal
court possessed of subject matter jurisdiction.5 3 To complicate
matters further, although early commentators on the impeach-
ment process sometimes extended reasomng about the inappro-
priateness of judicially created standards to matters of
procedure, 154 Justice Story at least was hopelessly inconsistent
on that subject.'"
If that were all, one might conclude that there is no consti-
tutional or prudential barrier to judicial review of the procedures
employed by the House and Senate in the impeachment process.
It is not all, however, even passing the implications of the other
elements of the political question doctrine for the resolution of
the issue. Some have relied on the common sense view that
"procedural decisions will inevitably be tied to judgments on
the merits,' ' 5 6 that in other words even limited judicial control
of procedure could vitiate exclusive congressional control of
substance. I would add to that common sense view the formal
argument that, apart from article I, section 5, the grants of the
power to impeach and of the power to try impeachments include
inherent powers to determine the rules for those respective pro-
ceedings, and that if the greater powers are exclusive, so are the
lesser' 57-subject only to judicial review for consistency with
specific procedural directives in the Constitution. As for Justice
1,3 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cI. 6 (senators on oath or affirmation; Chief Justice
presides when President tried; conviction requires concurrence of two thirds of members
present.).
,54 See W RAwLE, supra note 37, at 201.
M7 Compare 2 J. SToRY, supra note 37, at § 763 with d. at §§ 796-97.
,16 The Law of Impeachment, supra note 117, at 170.
" Ancillary to the sole power of impeachment vested in the House and the
power to try impeachments vested in the Senate is the power to govern the
tirmng and the extent of discovery that will be allowed. The doctrine of the
separation of powers that denies a court the power to enjoin impeachment
also demes a court the power to dictate how the impeachment proceedings
shall be conducted. See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 501
(dictum).
In Re Grand Jury Proceedings of Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Miami), 669 F Supp. at 1078;
cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456-60 (1939) (Black, J., concumng) (exclusive
control over amendment process includes steps leading to determination that amendment
has been adopted).
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Story, we should recognize that he was not directly addressing
the question that concerns us and that the source of his incon-
sistency was an argument pitched to another audience, in favor
of his campaign for federal common law 158
I also assume that freedom from judicial review on most
matters of substance and procedure in the impeachment process
does not entail the freedom of members of Congress to ignore
those parts (that is, most) of the Constitution that are not
specifically addressed to the process. 15 9 I assume that, as consci-
entious legislators, 160 members of Congress will endeavor to de-
fine the applicability of constitutional requirements announced
in other contexts to the impeachment process and that they will
endeavor to ensure that their proceedings and decisions comport
with the constitutional norms thus determined.
1. Impeachment by the House of Representatives
In 1980 testimony concerning legislative proposals in the field
of federal judicial discipline, Representative Rodino recalled that,
when the resolutions impeaching President Nixon were referred
to the House Judiciary Committee, "we were forced to proceed
with virtually no guideposts' ' 161 and that the Committee "created
almost from whole cloth a procedure for conducting our inquiry
and resolving each of the myriad problems we encountered.' ' 62
In that regard, Rodino "recommend[ed] that we on the Judiciary
Committee consider improvements in the way in which we handle
"I See 2 J. STORY, supra note 37, at §§ 796-97; Jay, Origins of Federal Common
Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. RPv 1231, 1294-1300 (1984-85). Story's view that the
common law "regulate[d], mterpret[ed], and control[led] the powers and duties of the
court of impeachment," 2 J. STORY, supra note 37, at § 796, was no more inconsistent
with his belief that courts were "exempt[ed] from all participation in, and control
over," id. at § 764, the impeachment process, than is the view taken below that the
House and Senate are bound by the Constitution, although their interpretations of its
requirements are not subject to judicial review.
" See C. BLAcic, supra note 117, at 23-24; Goldstein, supra note 141, at 187-89.
1' See Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation
27 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1974-75).
161 Judicial Tenure and Discipline 1979-80: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 127 (1980).
" Id. at 128.
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complaints against judges" with a view toward "changes in the
rules for the review and disposal of complaints." 16e
In the House Report on the bill that, as amended, became
the 1980 Act, the House Judiciary Committee stated that it had
"acted to firm up its impeachment authority by referring all
complaints against federal judges to a single subcommittee (the
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admimstration
of Justice)."' 64 Moreover, the Comrmttee expressed willingness
"to improve its oversight over federal judges and to consider
improvements in the way that it handles complaints against
judges."1 65
The House Judiciary Committee, acting through the Subcom-
mittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice, unquestionably has "improve[d] its oversight over fed-
eral judges." 1 s But, although impeachment proceedings are not
without guideposts, in the form of a collection of precedents, 167
they are not in most respects governed by general rules.' 68 It is
true that in a changing political body like the House of Repre-
sentatives, 169 rules cannot ever be a source of long-term expec-
tations; indeed, even short-term expectations are subject to
frustration by changes in the rules during a session. It is also
true that in some respects every impeachment inquiry is Sul
generis, but it is not clear that the observation suffices as a
normative defense of ad hoc procedure.
A number of problems exist with the House's approach to
impeachment inquiries. First, most of the precedents available
363 Id. at 129.
'" H.R. REP. No. 1313, supra note 38, at 5.
361 Id. at 20.
11 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 8; Burbank, Politics and Progress, supra note
62, at 14.
11 See IMPEACHMENT, SELECTED MATERIALS ON PROCEDURE, supra note 45, at 57-
72, 687-740, 765-71. In addition, rules have been adopted for the conduct of specific
impeachment inquiries. See, e.g., Firmage & Mangrum, Removal of the President: Res-
ignation apd the Procedural Law of Impeachment, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1109-10 (pro-
cedural rules for the Nixon impeachment inquiry).
368 Presumably, however, an impeachment inquiry is subject to any applicable rules
of the House and of the House Judiciary Committee. See, e.g., H.R.R. XI(2)(K) (inves-
tigative hearing procedures), reprinted in CoNsTtoIN, JEFERSON'S MANUAL ANm RULES
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVs, H.R. Doc. No. 279, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 434-36
(1987) [hereinafter H.R. Doc. No. 279].
9 See Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 707 n.4 (1966).
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as "guideposts" are at least fifty years old, and the two of most
recent vintage were indeed Sul generis m consequential respects.170
Second, even if that were not the case, and in a body whose
membership is relatively transient, exclusive resort to precedents
for procedural guidance would involve inefficient duplication of
effort. Third, guideposts can point in different directions, pro-
viding opportunity for argument about the proper direction, and
hence occasiomng delay 171
Rules need not be inflexible, and if the label is important
for political purposes, they need not even be called rules. 72
Whether, however, the preferred label is "rules," "guidelines,"
"standards," or even "distillation of practice," the need is for
a body of general procedural directives available at the start of
an impeachment inquiry and presumptively applicable to the
conduct of that inquiry The goal of the exercise would not be
to create or to honor expectations, except perhaps the expecta-
tion that, as conscientious legislators, members of the House
have given sustained thought to their constitutional responsibil-
ities. The goal would be to prevent the rule of a graveyard on
the one hand or of an immaculate conception on the other, as
well as to reduce the costs, delays, and opportunities for tactical
maneuvering inherent in a regime of procedural adhockery 173
170 1 refer to the impeachment inquiries concermng former President Nixon and
Judge Claiborne. The rules adopted for the Nixon inquiry, see supra note 167, may not
be a good general model-indeed they may cause mischief-because of the special pro-
cedural solicitude shown for a president. The Claiborne inquiry, on the other hand, was
circumscribed because of his criminal conviction. See infra text accompanying notes 178-
94.
17 See upra note 170.
Mn "Those who prefer discretion to rules on particular subjects are often victims of
the widespread misimpression that rules are necessarily inconsistent with discretion; guid-
ing rules and rules with escape clauses are not inconsistent with discretion. " 2 K. DAvis,
ADMuNSTRATivE LAW TREAnnE 186 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis in original).
173 Cf. Burbank, supra note 7, at 324-25 ("skeletal rulemaking promotes inefficiency
as well as uncertainty").
In the context of impeachment, a member of the House could object that the
adoption of general rules rmght invite judicial review. Cf. Senate Rules, supra note 21,
at 27 (Senator Byrd questions whether specifying burden of persuasion in the Senate
Rules would invite an attempt to secure judicial review). But it is unclear to me why
general rules are different in that respect from rules adopted for a specific inquiry, see
supra note 167, and as to both I do not believe judicial review is available. See supra
text accompanying notes 149-58.
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Although panic at the prospect of the impeachment process
running its course has been most noticeable in the Senate, there
is cleamng to be done in both Houses.
Subcommittees have a peculiar history in the House of Rep-
resentatives. 174 It may therefore seem churlish, or at least naive,
to note the recent departures from the House Judiciary Com-
mittee's effort "to firm up its impeachment authority by refer-
ring all complaints against federal judges to a single subcommittee
(the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Adrmnis-
tration of Justice)."' 7 5 Whatever the cause of those departures,
one of them has elicited unwarranted and unfair speculation
about the likely results of the current investigation of Judge
Hastings. 7 6 More generally, considerations siilar to those sup-
porting the argument for rules or guidelines also support giving
to one subcommittee the initial responsibility of conducting an
impeachment investigation. 177
Finally in connection with the House's role in the impeach-
ment process, I return to the question of increasing the useful-
ness of criminal law enforcement without creating irrelevant
incentives for law enforcement officials. In its report recom-
mending the resolution impeaching Judge Claiborne, the House
Judiciary Committee observed that "[t]here was no need for an
independent finding of facts about Judge Claiborne's conduct
by the Committee,' 17 because they had "already been found
under a judicial procedure which afforded the respondent full
"I See Tim RALPH NADER CONGRESS PROJECT, TiHE JuDiiCARY ComirrEs 32-57,
367-83 (1975).
7I H.R. REP. No. 1313, supra note 38, at 5. The Hastings inqmry was referred to
the Subcommittee on Cnminal Justice. See Marcus, Congress Reluctantly Takes up
Hastings' Ouster, Legal Times, March 30, 1987, at 2. The Nixon inquiry was referred to
the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights. See supra note 4.
176 A number of people with whom I have discussed the Hastings inquiry assume
that he will not be impeached because the Chair of the Subcommittee, Representative
Conyers, is, like Judge Hastings, a black. It is sad that, with Judge Hastings leveling
charges of racism at the likes of Judge Frank Johnson and John Doar, see, e.g., Taylor,
Top Panel Urges Congress to Weigh Ousting of Judge, N.Y. Times, March 18, 1987, at
Al, some interested observers thereby convict themselves of that charge. See Marcus,
supra note 175, at 2.
'I" See supra text accompanying notes 167-73. Workload is, however, a weighty
countervailing consideration. See Greenhouse, Judicial Impeachment: Its Process Anti-
quated?, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1988, at A22.
7I H.R. REP. No. 688, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1986).
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due process rights. ' 179 The Committee noted, however, that it
had "nonetheless through the hearing process and subsequent
deliberations, examned the facts and circumstances supporting
the jury verdict and conviction of Judge Claiborne."' 80 In sum,
[a]fter completing its factual examination, the Committee con-
cluded that, where a complete and final record of adjudicated
proceedings leading to a guilty verdict is before it, the Com-
mittee is justified in taking action analogous to the concept of
"judicial notice," but in a legislative setting. That is, the
factual findings have already been made by a unanimous jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.' 1
In my view, the Committee was on the right track, although I
do not find the suggested analogy of "judicial notice" as helpful
as that of issue preclusion. 82 More important, at the time of the
Committee's inquiry, Judge Claiborne had exhausted all avenues
of direct appeal, but his collateral attack on the conviction was
still pending. 183 In the absence of affirmance on appeal-such a
case may never arise-I doubt that it would be appropriate even
for the House to accord preclusive effect to the factual findings
necessarily implicit in a guilty verdict. At least it would not seem
appropriate if an appeal were pending that included claims of
error casting doubt on the evidentiary foundation of the verdict
or on the integrity of the fact-finding process. In addition, when
a collateral attack on a conviction is pending, it may be that the
House should consider whether success in that effort would cast
doubt on the factual predicate for its deliberations. Finally, in
either event, attention should be given to the question, if and
when it ever arises, whether the House should consider claims
I" Id.
180 Id.
Is' Id.
"1 See Hearing on S.J. Res. 364 & S.J. Res. 370, supra note 5, at 34 (statement of
Stephen B. Burbank); RSATEm -N (SEcoND) OF JUDG ENTs § 27 (1982). Although the
pendency of an appeal would not deprive a judgment of finality for purposes of issue
preclusion under the Restatement, see id. at § 13 comment f, I argue below for a different
rule in this context. Note, however, the suggestion that "[i]t may be appropnate to
postpone decision of [the] question [of preclusion] until the proceedings addressed to the
judgment are concluded." Id.
"I See H.R. RE. No. 688, supra note 178, at 19-20.
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of error implicating the trier's fact-finding that were not made
in judicial proceedings114
In this only modestly revised account of the appropriate
procedure for the conduct of an impeachment inquiry in the
case of a convicted felon, I have sought to be careful in describ-
ing both those claims of error that, in my view, ught justify
the failure to accord preclusive effect to the judgment of con-
viction and the circumstances in which that might be appropri-
ate. In the Claiborne inquiry, the subcommittee to which the
resolution of impeachment was referred originally limited the
scope of its inquiry 185 Ultimately, Judge Claiborne's counsel was
permitted "to present arguments outside the scope," and he
"discussed the entire chain of events that preceded Judge Clai-
b~rne's first trial.' 1 86 Because the matter was one "of first
impression for the Committee on the Judiciary," 1 7 and partic-
ularly in light of the suggested qualifications to the Committee's
stated conclusions developed above, how can one cavil at the
subcommittee's decision? The appearance of fairness is in the
eye of the beholder, and in any event, the incremental costs of
achieving it in a House inquiry that is otherwise suitably circum-
scribed may seem trivial. Perhaps, but the notion of "costs"
also may vary with the observer. The costs of permitting a
convicted felon to raise claims of error that have nothing to do
with the facts or the fact-finding process may one day include
letting the judge remain in office because the constable blun-
deted. Even on the unlikely assumption that the Senate is bound
to dismiss or that it should dismiss articles of impeachment
because of conduct of law enforcement officials that does not
implicate the fact-finding process, 18 in my view evidence of such
conduct is irrelevant in the House's deliberations.
"9 The use of rules of issue preclusion by analogy would suggest an affirmative
answer to this question. See RESTATMiIENT (SEcoND) OF JtuGmErrs, supra note 182, at §
17 comment e.
"I H.R, REP. No, 688, supra note 178, at 4.
,I id. at 5.
Id. at 24.
' The Senate Impeachment Tnal Committee, see infra text accompanying notes
202-10,
granted, to a substantial extent, a motion by the House to exclude, as
irrelevant, evidence of alleged judicial and prosecutonal rmsconduct ,
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Although, I have argued, the House Judiciary Committee
was on the right track in according preclusive effect to the
findings of fact necessarily implicit in the jury's verdict convict-
ing Judge Claiborne, it seemingly lost its way in formulating the
third article of impeachment. According to that article, the facts
that Judge Claiborne was found guilty of the crime of making
and subscribing a false income tax return and, following judg-
ment of conviction entered on the verdict, was sentenced to
imprisonment and a fine were sufficient grounds for a conclusion
that he was "guilty of misbehavior and of high crimes.' 18 9
The problem with the third article in the Claiborne matter
is not only that it may suggest no role for the House (or the
Senate) in examining the factual underpinnings of a criminal
conviction. The article, as explained in the Committee's report,
reflects the view that conviction of a felony is an impeachable
offense. 190 That view, if accepted, would constitute a self-in-
flicted wound, depriving our elected representatives of the duty
and hence opportunity to exercise judgment on the extent of
overlap between the prohibitions of a temporary majority and
the prohibitions of a supra-majority, between sins against the
commonwealth and those against the common weal. If accepted,
the premise of the third article would also constitute an irrelevant
In that ruling the Committee decided to permit, and the Committee subse-
quently did hear, testimony relating to Judge Claiborne's allegation that
government agents had influenced the testimony of witnesses.
S. REP. No. 511, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986). Although the full Senate voted not to
hear additional witnesses, 132 CONG. REc. S15,557 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986), the alleged
misconduct played a large part m the arguments presented to that body by Judge Claiborne
and his counsel. See id. at S15,485-87, S15,496-503 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986) (statement of
Mr. Goodman); id. at S15,503-05 (statement of Judge Claiborne). In fact, because the
arguments preceded the vote, they may have made it closer than it rmght otherwise have
been. See mnfra note 208. In any event, many senators were troubled by Judge Claiborne's
allegations. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN TiE IMPEACHMENT
TRIAL OF HARRY E. C amoR, A JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA, S. Doc. No. 48, 99th Cong., 2d'Sess. 303 (1986) [hereinafter
CLAmoRNE IMPEACHmENT TRIAL] (statement of Sen. Bingaman); Ed. at 316-17 (statement
of Sen. Pryor); id. at 317 (statement of Sen. Heflin); id. at 339 (statement of Sen.
McConnell); id. at 365 (statement of Sen. Levin); id. at 371 (statement of Sen. Gore).
"' 132 CONG. REc. H4711 (daily ed. July 22, 1986).
"g See H.R. REP. No. 688, supra note 178, at 22-23. Another problem with the
tlurd article, which I do not pursue, is its reference to "misbehavior," as if "good
behavior" were anything more than a definition of tenure.
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incentive to the enforcement of crimnal laws against federal
judges, tempting federal (and state?) law enforcement officials
to inquire whether the unpopular, eccentric, or otherwise suspi-
cious federal judge had perhaps ever poisoned her neighbor's
cat. 191
In both respects, the third article of impeachment in the
Claiborne matter shares defects of proposed constitutional
amendments that matter also has inspired. 192 Happily, just as
the Senate failed to convict on the third article, 193 it has not
pursued the proposed amendments beyond hearings at which
they were roundly (and squarely) criticized.1 94
2. Trial in the Senate
One need not be a cymc to understand why the prospect of
a trial on articles of impeachment is a source of consternation
in the Senate, at least when the individual impeached is the judge
of an inferior federal court. 95 The Senate's legislative business
is so demanding, by reason of both volume and importance,
that any trial, particularily a protracted trial, before that body
may seem a luxury we can no longer afford.1 96 That in any event
is the view ammating some of the recently proposed constitu-
tional amendments.
91 Certainly, it is not envisaged that there should be automatic removal of
an Article III judge for something less than commission of a serious crime.
Yet, how can one be sure that all federal, and particularly all state felomes
fall within that class. For example, can it be said that the conviction of any
one of the following felomes is so serious that a sitting Article III judge
should automatically lose his or her office: destruction of a mailbox, 18
U.S.C. § 1705; mailing of a firearm declared nonmailable by statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1715; poisomng of an ammal owned by another, Idaho Code §
18-2101(19); or adultery, id. § 18-6601.
Hearing on S.J. Res. 364 & S.J. Res. 370, supra note 5, at 17 (statement of Hon. J.
Clifford Wallace); see id. at 35, 43 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank).
392 See supra text accompanying notes 5, 191.
191 132 CONG. REc. S15,761 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986).
"' See Hearing on S.J. Res. 364 & S.J. Res. 370, supra note 5.
"[O]f [Judge Weinstein] one can say, after Justice Jackson: 'He is not non-final
because he is infenor, but he is inferior only because he is non-final.' " Burbank, The
Chancellor's Boot, 54 BRooKLYN L. REv. , (1988) (footnote omitted) (forth-
coming).
0I See supra text accompanying note 69; McConnell, Reflections on the Senate's
Role in the Judicial Impeachment Process and Proposals for Change, 76 Ky. L.J. 739
(1987-88).
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Unfortunately, the Senate seems never seriously to have con-
sidered adjustments in its own arrangements and only dimly to
perceive that other arrangements might obviate the need to resort
to the last line of defense against judicial misbehavior. I hope
to have clarified the latter perception. It remains to address
possible revisions in the final act.
Unlike the House, the Senate does have a set of general rules
applicable to trials on articles of impeachment. But these rules
have changed very little during the last one hundred and twenty
years. One consequential amendment, authorizing the taking of
evidence by a committee of less than the whole, was advocated
at least thirty years before it was accepted. Once accepted, it
was not availed of when an opportumty arose within a year,
although it was employed, as amended, at the next opportunity-
fifty years later. Revision of the Senate's rules has been a child
of the moment, and the moment seems usually to have been the
eve of trial, with the result that the project aborted or the
gestation period was too short to permit full development. Most
recently, the Senate simply adopted. 97
It is not my purpose in this Essay to review the Senate's
rules in detail. The existing literature, most of it dating from
the rmd-1970s, identifies the issues to be addressed, whether or
not one agrees with the authors' analyses or policy preferences. 198
In addition, although the Senate Rules Committee circumscribed
the scope of its reconsideration of the rules in 1974, the hearings
that informed its modest recommendations (not adopted until
1986) are a valuable resource. 199 Valuable too are papers com-
missioned in anticipation of a trial on articles impeaching Pres-
ident Nixon that treat issues of concern in any revision.20 Finally,
a fresh look at revising the Senate's rules should consider how
the rules have operated in practice and what has been the practice
197 See S. Res. 481, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); supra text accompanying notes 21-
28.
'98 See, e.g., Firmage & Mangrum, supra note 167; Futterman, supra note 21;
Williams, The Historical and Constitutional Bases for the Senate's Power to Use Masters
or Committees to Receive Evidence in Impeachment Trials, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv 512
(1975).
I" See Senate Rules, supra note 21.
See ImPEAcm NTrr: MISCELLANEous DOCtmENTS, supra note 141, at 167-204.
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in the absence of rules. The Senate too has precedents201 but
only one in the last fifty years and it unique in the history of
Senate trials.
For my limited purpose the contemporaneity rather than the
uniqueness of the trial of Judge Claiborne would probably be
determinative. No matter, for what was unique in that trial may
have to become the norm if Senators are to be persuaded (as-
suming they should be persuaded) not to flee the field.
Added in 1935 and revised in 1986,202 Rule XI provides for
the appointment by the presiding officer, "if the Senate so
orders," of a comnuttee of senators "to receive evidence and to
take testimony "203 Subject to contrary order by the Senate, a
committee thus appointed functions as the Senate would, with
the same powers and under the same rules, in gathering evi-
dence.2 When considering the transcript of a committee's pro-
ceedings, however, the Senate retains the right to (re)consider
questions of admissibility of evidence, as well as the rights to
hear the testimony of any witness "in open Senate" and, indeed,
to have "the entire trial in open Senate. ' 205 Moreover, the Senate
does not receive any recommendations from a committee ap-
pointed under Rule XI, and it is therefore wholly unconstrained,
as well as unguided, by the referral in determining the probative
value of evidence that it deems admissible. 20 6
Some commentators207 and legislators, 20 8 and even a federal
2' See, e.g., IMPEAcmENT, SELECTED MATERIALS ON PROCEDURE, supra note 45, at
73-685, 773-850.
202 The revisions were precisely those recommended in 1974. See supra text accom-
panying notes 22, 28.
211 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE IN THE SENATE WHEN SITTING ON IMPEACH-
MENT TRIALs XI, 132 CONG. Rac. S11,902 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986).
"' See id.
205 Id.
21 See id., Goldstein, Memorandum II on the Effect of the End of a Congress and
Start of a New Congress on a Pending Impeachment Proceeding: The Senate Trial, in
IMPEACHMENT: M1SCELLMAEOuS DoctnhmNTS, supra note 141, at 156-60.
See, e.g., No Time for Shortcuts, Nat'l L.J. Oct. 20, 1986, at 12, col. 1.
"I See, e.g., Heflin, In Wake of Claiborne Trial- Who Should Judge the Judges?,
Legal Times, Dec. 15, 1986, at 13 [hereinafter Heflin, In Wake of Claiborne Trial],
reprinted in 133 CONo. REc. S4990-91 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1987); Heflin, The Impeachment
Process: Modernizing an Archaic System, 71 JUDICATURE 123, 123-24 (1987) [hereinafter
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judge,209 have criticized the use of a committee to take evidence
at the Claiborne trial, and some doubt that the procedure is
constitutional. 210 Doubts on that score can only skew the consid-
eration of alternatives to current arrangements, and they should
therefore be settled-to the extent such questions are ever set-
tled-as soon as possible.
Those whose doubts spring from the language of the Con-
stitution, and in particular references to "the Senate, '211 should
consider that the Constitution's grant of original jurisdiction to
"the supreme Court ' 21 2 has not been thought to foreclose the
delegation of even more extensive powers to one not a member
of that body 213 They should also hesitate before attempting
distinctions based on familiar labels, each of which seems to fall
off the impeachment process as soon as it is applied. 214
Heflin, The Impeqchment Process]. "This delegation of authority by the Senate was not
without its critics. In fact almost a third of the Senate voted to take testimony on the
Senate floor." 132 CONG. REc. S16,788 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Dole). See id. at S15,762-73 (statement of Sen. Bingaman); infra note 210.
In denying Judge Claiborne's motion for a temporary restrainng order against
the Senate, after it had voted not to hear additional witnesses, see supra note 208, infra
note 210, Judge Harold Greene observed:
It is unfortunate in a way that evidence on impeachment was taken
through a committee for the first time, apparently, in the lustory of the
republic.
But the question is not whether I, or any other judge, would have
organized the impeachment process and impeachment procedure the way it
was organized in tis instance this month, but the question is whether this
court has the authority to interfere with the choice made by the Senate. In
my judgment, the answer is clearly no.
Claiborne v. United States Senate, No. 86-2780 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 1986) (transcript of
proceedings), prnted in CLAmoRwa I PEAC NT TRIAL, supra note 188, at 190-91; see
Roberts, Claiborne Ousted from U.S. Bench After Senate Vote, Los Angeles Daily J.,
Oct. 10, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
210 See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 35, at 169-73; C. BLACK, supra note 117, at 12
("of dubious constitutionality"); cf. Heflin, The Impeachment Process, supra note 208,
at 124 (questioning whether Senate proceedings in Claiborne trial "were in accordance
with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment"). Judge Claiborne moved to declare
Senate Rule XI unconstitutional and for a trial before the entire Senate. 132 CoNa. REc.
S15,485 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986). Those motions were effectively denied when the Senate
passed, by a vote of 61-32, Senator Dole's motion that additional witnesses not be heard.
132 CONG. REc. S15,557 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986).
2 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 3, quoted supra note 1; see C. BLACK, supra note 117, at
12.
212 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
213 See Williams, supra note 198, at 578-80.
214 See Goldstein, supra note 206, at 81-101; Williams, supra note 198, at 574-78,
582-86.
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Those whose doubts are reinforced by suppositions as to the
intent of the framers-who, after all, contemplated a smaller
Senate and lived in less complicated if not less interesting times-
should simply reconsider. English practice permitted the use of
committees by the House of Lords (in a process to which the
"criminal" label might stick), 25 and Jefferson specifically re-
ferred to that practice in the manual he prepared as President
of the Senate between 1797 and 1801.216
But again, this is not a question that requires extensive
original investigation. Having benefited from the thorough anal-
yses of others, I harbor no serious doubts about the constitu-
tionality of the Senate's use of a committee in the Clalborne
matter. Those who do should read the existing literature21 7 and
demonstrate the respects, if any, in which it is wanting. In the
process, they may also want to address arguments to the effect
that the Senate could constitutionally, and perhaps should in
some cases, go further than Rule XI presently permits, as by
using masters and/or authorizing its delegate(s) to make recom-
mendations that would assist Senators in resolving questions of
credibility 218
Simply as a matter of policy, I would not advocate the
Senate's use of a committee "to receive evidence and to take
testimony" in a trial on articles impeaching a president, a vice-
211 See supra text accompanying notes 110, 116.
216 See H.R. Doc. No. 279, supra note 168, at 299. In arguing against the use of
masters by the Senate, as proposed by Professor Stolz (Stolz, Disciplining Federal Judges:
Is Impeachment Hopeless?, 57 C~Lw. L. REv 659, 660, 664 (1969)), Professor Berger
invokes one part of Jefferson's Manual, see R. BEROER, supra note 35, at 171-72, but,
incredibly, does not mention the reference to committees. See Goldstein, supra note 206,
at 153.
Doubters should also consider the limited powers of a committee appointed under
Rule XI, see supra text accompanying notes 203-06, and the march of technology. The
taking of evidence by the Senate Committee in the Claiborne matter was videotaped. See
132 CoNo. REc. S15,487 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986) (statement of Manager Hughes).
217 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 198; see also Memorandum of Defendants in
Opposition to Application for a Temporary Restraimng Order, Claiborne v. United States
Senate, No. 86-2780 (D.D.C. 1986), printed in CLAMoRm IaAcMMNTr TIAL, supra
note 188, at 223-55; 132 CoNo. Rac. S16,350-53 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Mathias).
21S See, e.g., Stolz, supra note 216; Williams, supra note 198; see also infra note
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president, or a justice of the Supreme Court.219 Moreover, al-
though a 1986 amendment to Rule XI permits a committee of
any size (including, I suppose, one),220 I would not advocate
reducing the size below twelve when the Senate will find facts
as an original proposition. That is not because of any mystical
attachment to a number associated with a jury, although the
analogy may explain the reference in the rule as added in 1935.
On the contrary, recogmzing that the impeachment process is
peculiarly a political process, my policy preference springs from
the view that senators considering the transcript of proceedings
before a committee should have some assurance that decisions
as to the conduct of those proceedings were made by a group
large enough to approximate differences in the Senate as a
whole. 221 Obviously, this consideration would loom even larger
if the Senate were to empower committees appointed under Rule
XI to make recommendations, whether as to the facts that
should be found or, in addition, the conclusions that should be
drawn from them.m2
That the Senate did end up finding the facts in the Clalborne
trial as an original proposition came about, as it were, by
default. In authorizing the appointment of a committee under
Rule XI, the Senate had directed that all evidence be gathered
before the Senate convened as a whole. 3 Before the Committee,
the House managers moved that the Senate grant summary
219 Senator Hoar's 1904 proposal excluded the President, Vice-President, and any
person acting as president. 38 CoNG. Rac. 3992 (1904). A similar proposal by Senator
(later Justice) Sutherland during the impeachment trial of Judge Archbald would have
excepted the impeachment trials of "the President or Vice-President of the United States,
a member of the Cabinet, or a member of the Supreme Court of the United States." 49
CoNG. REc. 698 (1912). This proposal would have permitted the Judiciary Committee to
take testimony and to make advisory findings of fact. See id., cf. Goldstein, supra note
206, at 156 ("[T]he Senate trial envisioned for a presidential impeachment by Hamilton
in Federalist 65 would not be consistent with extensive use of masters.").
m' 132 CoNG. Rac. Sli,902 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986); see supra note 202.
2' Cf. Sperlich, " And Then There Were Six: The Decline oj the American
Jury," 63 JUDICATURE 262 (1980) (criticizing Supreme Court decisions regarding jury size
and unammity for ignoring or misusing empirical evidence regarding such matters as the
effect of size on group performance, group productivity, and representativeness).
2n This would require amending Rule Xi. See supra text accompanying note 206.
See S. Res. 481, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); 132 CONG. Rac. S11,673 (daily ed.
Aug. 14, 1986).
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disposition of article III,2 that the Senate apply collateral es-
toppel to articles I and 11,221 and that the Senate convene to
consider those motions before they became moot as a result of
the committee's proceedings. 6 After the committee had met in
closed session, the chair demed the last of these motions, invok-
ing his views on the merits as reason not to "disturbal the
Senate's careful decision that this committee receive the parties'
evidence prior to the Senate's consideration of the legal and
factual merits of the articles.''27 Because the committee lacked
the power to dispose of an article of impeachment or to make
findings of fact, the first two motions were probably doomed
before the Senate.?28
For the future, the Senate as a whole should address and
make provision in its rules for at least some of the questions
that arose in the Claiborne trial but that existing limitations on
the powers of a committee appointed under Rule XI and an
interpretation of the specific charge to the Claiborne committee
kept from full ventilation. Anticipating that discussion, I would
urge that summary disposition of an impeachment article is never
appropriate for the reasons advanced above in my discussion of
article III Is approved by the House. 229 As I have also indicated,
there is much to be said for granting substantial preclusive effect
to the findings of fact necessarily grounding a guilty verdict, at
least when the judgment of conviction has been affirmed on
appeal and so long as those involved in the impeachment process
n See REPORT OF THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRiAL COmMITTEE, supra note 72, at
43, 44.
See id. at 43, 51-53.
See d. at 43-44.
22 Id. at 109.
12 See id. at 44; S. REP No. 511, supra note 188, at 2. This was the view of the
House managers, but the problem was not precisely one of mootness. Rather, once a
committee of 12 Senators had taken evidence, it was unlikely that the Senate as a whole
would choose to ignore the product of its efforts, although it retained the right to do so.
See REPORT OF THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRtAm COMMnTTE, supra note 72, at 108. In
any event, the House withdrew its motions before the full Senate. 132 CoNo. REc.
S15,279 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1986) (remarks of Sen. Simpson). The Senate ultimately failed
to convict on article III. See supra text accompanying note 193.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 189-94. The Senate's failure to convict on
article III probably serves as a sufficiently clear precedent to obviate the need for a rule
on this issue. See supra text accompanying note 193. I am, of course, assuming a contested
article of impeachment.
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consider claims of error regarding the antecedent fact-finding
process that have not previously been rejected by the courts. 230
Perhaps, however, one should distinguish for these purposes
between the role of the House and the role of the Senate. Some
measure of efficiency can be achieved in the Senate process by
admitting evidence previously admitted in the criminal proceed-
ings.23' Efficiency is not, in any event, the most important value.
At the same time, it is not clear how according preclusive effect
to fact-finding in the circumstances described could plausibly be
deemed unfair or inconsistent with the exercise by the Senate of
its unique constitutional duty, which in these circumstances would
seem to have less to do with fact-finding than with the charac-
terization of the facts under the constitutionally prescribed sub-
stantive standard. 232
2 See supra text accompanying notes 178-88; see also supra note 228 and accom-
panying text.
21' See REPoRT OF THE SENATE Im Arcm NT TRIAL ComurrE, supra note 72, at
110-11 (granting House motions to admit trial testimony and exhibits and to accept prior
admissions); S. REP. No. 511, supra note 188, at 2.
21 Senator Mathias' argument to the contrary should be evaluated with the knowl.
edge that he was addressing not only the House's motion to give preclusive effect to facts
found in Judge Claiborne's criminal trial but also the motion to grant summary disposition
to article III. See REPORT OF THE SENATE IMA cInmNT TRAL CommTrTm, supra note
72, at 109-10; supra text accompanying notes 222-27. As to the latter motion, I agree
with the Senator. See supra text accompanying note 229. As to preclusion, however, I
am not persuaded by invocation of Hamilton's reference to "the double security intended
them by a double trial." Tim FEDERALisT No. 65, supra note 42, at 20. Hamilton was
there justifying the framers' choice of the Senate instead of the Supreme Court to try
impeachments, and he assumed (if he did not assume that the Constitution required, see
supra text accompanying note I11) that the impeachment trial would be held first.
Moreover, he assumed that a Supreme Court justice would preside at the subsequent
(crumnal) trial and, were the constitutional arrangements otherwise, might infect a jury
with his or her bias conceived from presiding at the impeachment trial. See 2 Farrand,
supra note 34, at 500. Whatever the force of this reasomng on Hamilton's assumptions,
it hardly seems applicable to the question under discussion.
Senator McConnell has offered some additional, quite practical, arguments in favor
of the course taken in the Clalborne trial, including concern about the possibility that
the criminal conviction might have been reversed and about the creation of a precedent
that "could estop the Senate from [removing] an official for improprieties on which he
had been acquitted for narrow techmcal reasons," McConnell, supra note 196, at 74$. I
have addressed the first concern. See supra text accompanying notes 182-84. The second
is a red herring. As noted above, it is important to distinguish between the facts necessarily
found (or issues necessarily determined) in the criminal proceeding and the result of that
proceeding. It is also important to identify the purposes of the respective proceedings and
the allocation and quantum of the burden of persuasion. Cf. RETATrEmENT (SEcoND) oF
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The experience of the committee appointed in the Claiborne
trial revealed other respects in which the existing rules, whatever
their suitability for trials "in open Senate," are ill adapted to a
smaller group. A number of those rules are instinct with the
limitations of proceedings before the full Senate.3 3 Some of
them were honored more in the breach than the observance by
the Claiborne committee.3 4 A fresh look at the Senate's rules
should include discrete attention to a subset of rules applicable
in, and only in, proceedings before a committee of less than the
whole.
The transcript of the proceedings of the Claiborne committee
tends to confirm, on the other hand, the Senate's wisdom in
refusing thus far to adopt detailed rules of evidence for impeach-
ment trials. Moreover, it suggests that, in revising the rules, the
Senate should avoid the temptation of borrowing wholesale the
Federal Rules of Evidence.2 5 Even in the absence of a formally
applicable body of evidence rules, the participants in the Clai-
JuDrGMENTS, supra note 182, at § 85 and comment g ("Effect of Criminal Judgment in
Subsequent Civil Proceeding").
233 See, e.g., Senate Rule XVI (requiring motions, objections, requests, or applica-
tions by parties or counsel to be addressed to presiding officer and empowering the latter
or any senator to require that they be committed to writing); Senate Rule XIX (senator's
questions and motions must be reduced to writing and put by presiding officer, and
senators may not engage in colloquy).
23 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SENATE IMPmACnENT TRIAL CoMm=rrE, supra note
72, at 46 (question by Sen. Hatch), 643-45 (questions by Sen. Heflin). Perhaps because
the chairman's reminder of the restrictions imposed by Rule XIX, see id. at 482, had not
been successful, the Senate granted the chairman authority to waive its requirement that
questions be put in writing and to establish terms and restrictions for questiomng. 132
CoNG. REc. S12,779 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1986). But Senators continued to ask questions
without first being recogmzed, see, e.g., REPORT OF THE SENATE ImPEAcHMENT TRILx
CoMMITTEE, supra note 72, at 847 (Sen. Heflin); colloquy was not uncommon, see id. at
779-80, 873-78, and it is not clear that Rule XIX's requirement that motions be put m
writing was ever observed. See, e.g., id. at 779 (Sen. Warner & Sen. Rudman), 916 (Sen.
Warner), 956-57 (Sen. Heflin), 963 (Sen. Bingaman), 1087-88 (Sen. Heflin).
Notwithstanding the restricted role of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, see
id. at 29, 109, some members commented at length on the credibility of a witness. See
d. at 1104-05 (statements of Sen. Rudman, Sen. DeConcini, & Sen. Gore).
13 Compare REPORT OF THE SENATE ImPFACwMENT TRIAL ComrTmrE, supra note
72, at 20 (Sen. Hatch recommends following the Federal Rules of Evidence) with id. at
21 (Sen. Gore argues that the Committee should not be bound by the Federal Rules of
Evidence). Senator Hatch and Senator Gore agreed that the Committee could do what it
wished in thus regard, and the matter was not specifically resolved.
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borne proceeding were alert to evidentiary questions. 2 6 It is not
hard to imagine a trial governed by a detailed body of rules
becormng bogged down in technical disputes, with the ascertain-
ment of facts the victim. Particularly when one imagines a trial
"in open Senate," the dangers of distraction are daunting.
The Senate appears always to have followed rules of evidence
in impeachment trials,237 and it should continue to follow those
that are deemed fundamental. To the extent that opimons differ
about what are the fundamental rules today, to provide guidance
to those preparing for trial, and to avoid disputes at trial, it
would be sensible to formulate a few broad and general rules.28
The sources mentioned previously discuss these matters in con-
siderable detail,2 9 and I will add only a few words.
Relevance remains the cornerstone of modern evidence law,2
and it is an imperative for impeachment trials as much as for
any other trial. Hearsay, if by that word we intend the elaborate
and largely irrational system accreted over two centuries of
distrust for juries,2" is not a cornerstone of anything except the
incomes of law professors. Trustworthiness and necessity should
be the dominant considerations in the Senate's decision whether
to admit relevant evidence that is hearsay according to whatever
test is accepted2 2 According to this view, the fact that evidence
would be admissible under a long-recognized exception to the
hearsay rule would not be determinative, as it apparently now
See, e.g., id. at 70-74, 110-11, 536-37, 539-41, 544, 547, 560, 565-66, 568-69, 574-
75, 577, 580, 595, 597-98, 607, 609-12, 616-17, 657, 659, 660, 664-65, 667, 671, 676, 676-
77, 680-81, 692-93, 696-97, 755, 759, 773, 776, 826-29, 840, 847, 848, 862, 884-85, 905-
06, 912, 916-17, 929, 948-51, 963, 1014, 1016, 1085-86, 1097, 1171, 1183-84.
2" See IMPFAc~m Nt, SELECTED MATER AMS ON PROCEDURE, supra note 45, at 243-
341, 789-93.
23 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 170-73 (arguments for presumptively applicable
rules to govern House impeachment inquiry).
"9 See Goldstein, Memorandum IV on Rules of Evidence for Senate Impeachment
Trials, in ImPEACrmENT: MiscELLArw ous Docum:ENTs, supra note 141, at 239; Firmage &
Mangrum, supra note 167, at 1059-61, 1062-78; Futterman, supra note 21, at 112-18.
See FED. R. EviD. 401-402.
See, e.g., Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 Hiatv. L.
Ray. 1786 (1979-80).
242 Cf. Goldstein, supra note 239, at 255-81; id. at 276 (concluding that "there are
good reasons for not holding the Senate strictly to judicial hearsay rules").
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is for purposes of rejecting a claim under the sixth amendment,243
although it would usually be sufficient. Similarly, the fact that
such an exception could not be found would not always require
exclusion if, evaluated discretely, the evidence were deemed highly
trustworthy and there was need for it because of the unavail-
ability of other comparably probative evidence.
Finally, if the Senate does revise its rules for impeachment
trials, it should avoid the temptation of other transplants besides
the Federal Rules of Evidence, in particular the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. One of the reasons, although not the primary
reason, the Senate's 1974 effort yielded such meager changes in
the rules was that the only concrete proposal the Committee on
Rules considered was hopelessly misdirected. That proposal, put
forward by Senator Mansfield,2 4 attempted to dress an impeach-
ment trial in the clothes of a federal civil action.245 Those clothes
do not fit comfortably 26 Some borrowing may be appropriate,
but it will necessarily be highly selective. For the rest, the clothes
must be custom-made, although even custom-made clothes may
draw inspiration from those that are mass-produced.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS: GENERAL
CONSIDERATIONS
My primary concerns in this Essay have been to urge that
Congress proceed with care and thoroughness in considering
whether to initiate the process of changing the arrangements for
removing federal judges that are prescribed by the Constitution,
that it view those arrangements in the context both of our
tripartite system of government and of all of society's defenses
against the excesses of life tenure, and that its comparative
2 See Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2782-83 (1987). Professor Gold-
stein noted possible constraints, analogous to those imposed by the sixth amendment, on
complete relaxation of hearsay rules in Senate trials. See Goldstein, supra note 239, at
280-81.
2" See Senate Rules, supra note 21, at 171-234.
'A' See, e.g., id. at 223-25 (Rule 5-Pleadings); id. at 225-26 (Rule 6-Conference and
Trial Order); id. at 226-27 (Rule 7-Discovery). Senator Mansfield also borrowed from the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but less extensively. See id. at 173, 202, 213.
21 See, e.g., id. at 29 (Sen. Thurmond criticizes proposal regarding discovery); id.
at 83 (Sen. Helms suggests that proposal regarding amendment of articles is unconstitu-
tional); id. at 200 (Sen. Stenms agrees with Sen. Helms).
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assessment include the costs and the benefits of current arrange-
ments as they might be adjusted with fidelity to the Constitution.
This is not the place for a detailed analysis of alternatives to
current arrangements that might be implemented by constitu-
tional amendment. A few general observations may, however,
be helpful.
The more ambitious of the proposed constitutional amend-
ments introduced during or after the Claiborne affair differ in
a number of respects, but they share one fatal defect. They
would empower Congress to prescribe by legislation either the
process leading to removal or the substantive standard for re-
moval or both. Such open-ended proposals constitute "an invi-
tation to domination of one branch of government by another
that should be no more acceptable today than it was to the
framers 200 years ago." ' 2A7
One of the constitutional amendments proposed in response
to recent developments provides:
The Congress shall have the power by appropriate legislation
to set standards and guidelines by which the Supreme Court
may discipline judges appointed pursuant to Article III who
bring disrepute on the Federal courts or the administration of
justice by the courts. Such discipline may include removal from
office and diminution of compensation. 241
Another of the proposed constitutional amendments would em-
power Congress "to provide procedures for the removal from
office of Federal judges serving pursuant to Article III of the
Constitution, found to have committed treason, bribery, or other
high crimes and misdemeanors." 249
Assuming that these proposals should be taken at face value
(not as mere vehicles for developing specifics to be embodied in
revised proposals),20 they are objectionable without reference to
specifics their sponsors may have had in mind. As to the first
of them,
24 Burbank, Politics and Progress, supra note 62, at 22.
24 S.J. Res. 370, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (introduced by Sen. DeConcini).
14 S.J. Res. 113, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) (introduced by Sen. Heflin for
himself, Sen. Shelby, Sen. Stevens, and Sen. Sanford).
20 See supra text following note 67; infra note-252.
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we would be foolish to give Congress a blank check "to set
standards and guidelines" for the discipline (including the re-
moval) of federal judges. It is no answer that the
Supreme Court would be the instrument of Congress for these
purposes. For, passing the burdens under which the Court
presently labors, it would be bound by the constitutional
amendment and implementing legislation and would have only
as much leeway to "maintain the independence of the judicial
branch" as the legislation afforded.
Nor is it a comfort that the legislation would be cabined
by a constitutional standard of bringing "disrepute on the
Federal courts or the adrmnistration of justice by the courts."
The capacity of the standard to lead to mischief is well docu-
mented in the debates and deliberations that preceded the
passage of the 1980 Act. Finally, even if we were willing to
trust future Congresses to adhere to a pnnciple of generality
in enacting implementing legislation, we should be concerned
about another danger: the threat that open-ended disciplinary
standards and procedures pose to the independence of individ-
ual federal judgesY1
The second proposal at least would perpetuate the current con-
stitutional standard, but it is otherwise open-ended and for that
reason unacceptable. 25 2
Assuming that any proposed constitutional amendment mer-
iting serious consideration would be sufficiently specific as to
both process and substantive standards to permit informed judg-
ment on its likely costs and benefits, how should Congress assess
proposed alternatives?
First, Congress should avoid re-inventing the wheel. The
legislative history of the 1980 Act, which for present purposes
is a history of more than a decade of hearings and reports,
includes substantial information about other systems of judicial
discipline, in particular those used in the statesY 3 Although the
"I Burbank, Politics and Progress, supra note 62, at 22 (footnotes omitted).
252 In fact, it appears that Sen. Heflin has a particular alternative in mind. See
Heflin, The Impeachment Process, supra note 208, at 125 ("I am currently in the process
of drawing up legislation to implement my proposed constitutional amendment. This
legislation would create a Judicial Inquiry Commission and a Court of the Judiciary.").
2' See H.R. RaP. No. 1313, supra note 38, at 2-5; Burbank, supra note 7, at 291-
300.
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published literature evaluating the operations of state systems in
recent years is not very illuminating for this purpose, 2 4 that
literature, together with other available data, may prove helpful
in testing Senator Heflin's recent clamis as to the effectiveness
of state systems and their adaptability to the federal system. 25
Second, if Congress concludes that change is necessary in
the current arrangements for removing federal judges, it should
consider whether the new arrangements should be confined to
that situation, as Senator Heflin's proposal, although not his
explanation of It,256 suggests. The question necessarily implicates
the effectiveness of the 1980 Act in resolving problems that do
not warrant removal, a question, that, if Congress follows the
course recommended here, will already have been addressed.2 7
I pose it because of two concerns. One is that a monolithic
system of judicial discipline for the most trivial as well as the
most serious offenses seems likely to be shaped with the latter
in mind. 25 8 Alerted to the costs of trans-substantive procedure in
other contexts, 259 we should not quickly impose it on the sub-
stantive law of judicial discipline. Put another way, we should
not use a "hundred-ton gun' 260 to kill a gnat. The second, and
a related concern, is that the more adversarial any new (trans-
substantive) arrangements are, the more likely is the new system
25 See, e.g., Moser, Populism, a Wisconsin Heritage: Its Effect on Judicial Account-
ability in the State, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1982-83); Shaman, State Judicial Conduct
Organizations, 76 Ky. L.J. 811 (1987-88); Stem, Is Judicial Discipline in New York State a
Threat to Judicial Independence?, 7 PACE L. REv 291 (1987); Wicker, Are Judges
Receiving Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings?, 22 JuDGEs J. 35 (Spring 1983);
Comment, Judicial Misconduct in California, 11 SAN. Fmu. V.L. REv. 43 (1983-84).
"I See Heflin, In Wake of Claiborne Trial, supra note 208; Heflin, The Impeachment
Process, supra note 208, at 125. Senator Heflin may be unaware that Congress did
"examine the various ways in which the states remove judges," id., prior to passing the
1980 Act. At least when the issue was use of those models for action short of removal,
they were found inappropriate for transplant to the federal system. See, e.g., H.R. REP.
No. 1313, supra note 38, at 3-5; Burbank, supra note 7, at 291-308; see also infra note
268.
" See Heflin, In Wake of Claiborne Trial, supra note 208; Heflin, The Impeachment
Process, supra note 208, at 124.
2n See supra text accompanying notes 58-65, 76-101.
258 Cf. supra note 170 (suggesting that House rules for Nixon impeachment inquiry
may prove to be a rmschievous precedent).
29 See, e.g., Burbank, The Costs of Complexity (Book Review), 85 MicH. L. REv.
1463, 1465, 1474-76 (1986-87).
2_ See supra text accompanying note 55.
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to discourage talented lawyers from aspiring to or remaining on
the federal bench. 261 I happen to believe that the 1980 Act was
necessary and that its faithful implementation by the federal
judiciary is important. 26 2 But there is a limit to letting the exis-
tence of a "few bad apples" dictate health regulations, and
given the present state of morale of the federal judiciary, that
limit is quickly reached.
Finally, although perhaps the first consideration for Con-
gress, any suggested alternative that is found in another system
Should be analyzed in its context. What is the place of judicial
independence in that system, and more generally, what is the
place of the judiciary in the structure of government? To put a
point on such inquiries, what comfort can those concerned about
the federal system take from assurances that a judicial discipline
system has not diluted judicial independence in a state whose
judges are elected? 263
CONCLUSION
Concerns about efficient administration of the law are as
pervasive as they are understandable. So, it may be, is the
tendency of institutional self-interest to shape conceptions of
institutional mission, particularly when, in serving its own inter-
ests, an institution can preserve or even augment its power. 264
Constitutional amendment is, however, an expensive way to
experiment with alternatives to current arrangements, and neither
institutional self-interest nor institutional power is a compelling
argument for change when those arrangements are designed to
preserve the countervailing power of another institution.
The removal of federal judges is, I have argued, a polycentric
problem. Its wise resolution requires an antecedent process of
study and deliberation far more ambitious and painstaking than
161 Cf. H. REP. No. 1313, supra note 38, at 3-4 (rejecting such arrangements for
discipline short of removal), Burbank, supra note 7, at 306-07, 325. On the problem of
morale, see, e.g., R. POSNER, Tm FErfERAI. CouRTs: CIsis AND REFORM 29-47 (1985);
Fembetg, The Coming Deterioration of the Federal Judiciary, 42 Rac. A.B. CrrIy N.Y.
119 (1987),
21 See, e.g., Burbank, Politics and Progress, supra note 62.
2 See R. WHMELER & A. LEvNw, supra note 66, at 14-27, 59-61, 75-76.
See, e.g., Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, supra note 259.
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proposals for this or that alternative are likely to elicit. In
addition to advocating such a process in this Essay, I have
attempted to suggest an analytical approach, to sketch the con-
tours of relevant inquiries, to put some questions to rest, and
to raise others. Much research and analysis remains to be done.
There is reason to hope that Congress will ensure that the task
is pursued.
"[I]n the wake of the impeachment and removal of ' 265 Judge
Claiborne, Senator Dole not only requested the Rules Committee
to review the Senate rules for impeachment trials and urged the
Senate Judiciary Committee "to give proposals for a constitu-
tional amendment early consideration. 2es He also proposed the
creation by statute of a "bipartisan Commission, supported by
a National Advisory Committee, to investigate and study the
constitutional problems of impeaching an Article III judge, and
the advisability of proposing an amendment to the Constitution
regarding the possible impeachment of such judges. '267 In intro-
ducing the bill that would establish the commission and advisory
group, Senator Dole made clear his view that the matter requires
"thorough and expeditious consideration," as well as his goal
that the "ad hoc group" established by the resolution "explore
the options of alternative remedies to impeachment and
fashion an appropriate amendment to the Constitution."' 8 Al-
though Senator Dole's proposal has languished in the Senate, it
has been picked up and refined by Representative Kastenmeler
in a bill recently introduced in the House. 269
Senator Dole and Representative Kastenmeier have a good
idea, although the former may underestimate the time that a
commission would require for the work if expedition were not
to overwhelm thoroughness. 270 We have waited two hundred
132 CONG. REc. S16,788 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986).
Id. at S16,789.
16 S. 2934, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1986); 132 CONG. REc. S16,789 (daily ed. Oct.
16, 1986).
m 132 CONG. Rc., supra note 267. Senator Dole is aware of the potential usefulness
of the pre-1980 Act legislative record. See id., supra note 255.
See H.R. 4393, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 201-10 (1988); Kastenmeier, supra note
93, at 793-96.
1 See 132 CONG. Rsc. supra note 267 (anticipating report of Commission "shortly
after the next Congress begins its work"). Representative Kastenmeier's bill is more
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years for a change, and, realistically, new arrangements could
not be in place in time to deal with the matters that prompt
present concerns. Whatever the future holds in the way of federal
judges unfit to serve, we must ensure that the arrangements we
make for them do not disable the federal judiciary as a whole.
realistic, calling for a report by the proposed commission "not later than one year after
the date of its first meeting." H.R. 4393, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 208 (1988).
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